

**THE CONDITIONAL EFFECTS OF FEMALE DESCRIPTIVE
REPRESENTATION: A STUDY OF POLICY INFLUENCE IN STATE
LEGISLATURES, 1983-2002**

A Dissertation

by

MARY ELIZABETH BARNES

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

December 2011

Major Subject: Political Science

The Conditional Effects of Female Descriptive Representation: A Study of Policy

Influence in State Legislatures, 1983-2002

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Approved by:

Chair of Committee,	Kenneth J. Meier
Committee Members,	Michelle Taylor-Robinson
	Sarah Fulton
	Julia Kirk Blackwelder
Head of Department,	James Rogers

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ABSTRACT

The Conditional Effects of Female Descriptive Representation: A Study of Policy

Influence in State Legislatures, 1983-2002. December 2011

Mary Elizabeth Barnes, B.A., The University of Texas at Austin; M.A., Sam Houston

State University

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kenneth J. Meier

Many scholars believe in order to have democratic legitimacy, females should be represented in governing bodies at all levels. Significant literature on female descriptive representation in the U.S. for women's policy responsiveness confirms the importance between the percentage of females in the legislature and public policy that represents women's interests. At the same time, there is research suggesting female representatives do not always represent women's interests. This study examined female descriptive representation and incorporation and its effect on substantive representation of female group salient issues and answered the following research question: Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues?

This research project replicated Robert Preuhs' 2006 work by studying the conditional effects of female descriptive representation in the state legislature from 1983-2002. The study is important because it turns to state level data and accounts for

all mechanisms of influence, as well as conditional effects of a liberal governing coalition, to determine whether female descriptive representation exerts policy influence. Five theoretical models were presented and tested in this work: The Presence Model, the Simple Incorporation Model, the Specific Institutional Incorporation Model, The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model, and The Party as a Substantive Representative Model. The dependent variables selected were *per pupil educational expenditures*, *percentage of children without health insurance*, *welfare benefits*, and *percentage of child support collected*. An OLS model with a lagged dependent variable and panel correlated standard errors was used to estimate the coefficients for each dependent variable. Female descriptive representation and incorporation did have some influence on substantive representation with *welfare benefits* and *percentage of child support collected*. The female influence is important and increasing the number of females in the legislature will result in more policy and benefits for issues important to women in society. However, examining the issues in a different way or with different dependent variables may provide better results indicating the importance of female descriptive representation on substantive representation of female group salient issues.

DEDICATION

To all females around the world hoping your “voice” is always heard.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

John Stuart Mill, British philosopher and economist, argued more than a century ago “in the absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the omitted is always in danger of being overlooked; and when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons who it directly concerns” (as cited in Pitkin 1967, 22). Hannah Pitkin felt similar and considered it only logical “to expect the composition [of a legislature] to determine its activities” (1967, 63). Significant literature on female descriptive representation in the U.S. for women’s policy responsiveness confirms the importance between the percentage of females in the legislature and public policy that represents women’s interests (Reingold 2000; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991, for example). At the same time, there is research suggesting female representatives do not always represent women’s interests (Phillips 1995; Weldon 2002). This study will examine female descriptive representation and incorporation and its effect on substantive representation of female group salient issues and answer the following research question: Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues?

Many scholars believe in order to have democratic legitimacy, females should be

This dissertation follows the style of *American Journal of Political Science*.

represented in governing bodies at all levels. “A government that is democratically organized cannot be truly legitimate if all its citizens from...both sexes do not have a potential interest in and opportunity for serving their community and nation” (Thomas 1998, 1). There is also growing evidence that female representatives have been found to identify with promoting a more gender-equal society and that women's presence in political decision-making is “essential” for a quality democratic process (Galligan 2007). The opportunity in the United States for females to run and get elected to governing bodies is now available to them. At the same time, examining the number of females in governing bodies, women are still grossly underrepresented. Does this underrepresentation affect the policy issues and preferences being addressed? Does an increase in female officeholders result in increased attention to different types of issues and interest in governing bodies? Is it merely the number of females in government offices that have the influence on policy or is it positions of power that garner influence? Are there conditional factors at work that negate female legislators’ influence?

Much work in the gender politics literature stresses the importance of electing more women to public office in order to adequately represent females and the political issues that they find most important. In other words, increasing female descriptive representation will lead to great substantive representation. Women will “stand for” women and also “act for” them (Pitkin 1967). Many female legislators have expressed that they are equipped to handle female constituent issues and they are committed to representing women (Carroll 2003; Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Reingold 1992; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). In studies of state legislatures, women reported

more liberal policy attitudes and they exhibited a greater commitment to pursuing legislation important to women (Dolan and Ford 1995; Thomas 1994). Majorities of both Democratic and Republican female legislators have revealed they have a responsibility to represent women's interests ("Women State Legislators" 2001). In local governing bodies, because of their smaller size and less formal rules, the influence of minority legislators was stronger (Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, et al. 2005; Stewart, England and Meier 1989) and women are more likely to speak out in favor of issues (Flammang 1985). Evidence from studies of Congress reveal that more women are sponsoring legislation important to females, participating in floor debates on women's issues, and using their positions on committees to make sure legislation related to women's issues does not fail (Dodson 1998; Swers 2000).

There is significant literature revealing a "yes" when answering the questions of whether women better represent women (Mansbridge 1999), but there is also a significant amount of literature negating this claim. Women may behave in an isolated manner when legislating and they may not be able to articulate what females as a group really want (Weldon 2002). There may be no way to establish accountability to women as a group (Phillips 1995). As Pitkin suggests, in order to fully understand representation, one must study all forms of representation, not just focusing on descriptive and substantive. Formal representation, referring to the institutional rules and processes, and symbolic representation, referring to how the represented "feel" about their representative is also important to understanding female representation (Pitkin 1967). Also, while women have made significant gains in representation, women

are still underrepresented as a group. Some scholars argue that until women reach the “critical mass” level, or become a large minority in the legislature, they will not have as much impact particularly when women are only a few token representatives (Childs and Krook 2008; Kanter 1977). Other scholars find different conditions could lead to female legislators having policy successes besides reaching a certain percentage in the legislature (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007). Finally, there is research indicating that descriptive representation is not always the best way to gain substantive representation. Constituent’s substantive interests must be represented and if a non-descriptive representative (someone who doesn’t share the same physical characteristics of the constituent) can best do that, there should not be a push for descriptive representation (Diamond 1977; Mansbridge 1999; Swain 1993; Young 1997).

From the research that indicates female descriptive representation is the best way to have substantive representation of female group salient issues, there must be a clear distinction between female salient issues and male salient issues. Do females have a “different voice” (Gilligan 1982b)? Historically and through the time period of this study (1983-2002), women are seen as a diverse group of people but still a group that has political opinions distinguishable from men and share interests that are salient to women as a group (Sapiro 1981; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007). Findings suggest women are typically more supportive of government programs, government spending and government action (Gilligan 1982b; Schlesinger and Heldman 2000; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Women are more compassionate than men, favor and support social policies, like issues dealing with families and children, education, health care, while men

have more “pocketbook” concerns and prioritize issues dealing with the tax cuts, the economy, and business (Alvarez and McCaffery 2003; Thomas 1991). Due to women’s role as caregiver and their historically disadvantaged role in society, they tend to advocate more for these needs in society and push government to do the same (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995). There is a gender gap between men and women on issues of social policy and social welfare spending and the salience of these issues are found to be one of the strongest predictors of behavior for females and males (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999).

If a gender gap exists between males and females in society, how does this translate into legislative behavior, especially if descriptive representation is a good predictor of substantive representation? Personal interviews of legislators have revealed that female legislators give higher priority to women’s issues. Historically, they have focused their attention in the legislature on issues such as health care, the welfare of families and children, and women’s rights legislation (Carroll 2003; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Thomas 1994; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997). Interviews of female legislators reveal that their top priority was to expand women’s opportunities, protect the rights of women, and support and work on legislation to benefit women more than male legislators. Many female members of Congress believe they are “surrogate representatives” for women (Carroll 2003, 11).

Female legislators are also found to prioritize women’s issues differently than men because women have found new institutional strategies to engage in feminist activities. Female legislators typically identify with feminism and are closely related to

networks providing the female group perspective (Carroll 2003; Katzenstein 1998). Women feel accountable to the women's movements and think in terms of the group perspective which is important to substantive representation of female group salient issues (Mansbridge 1999). What about women who do not identify as feminist? Some scholars argue that they may be "closet" feminists (Carroll 2003) and are committed to the goals of the women's movement even though they do not make that position public. Even Republican women legislators have revealed, though they differ ideologically than Democrats, that they will seek to promote legislation they believe will serve women and they work across party lines to address women's issues (Hawkesworth, et al, 2001). At the same time, in a highly polarized political environment, Republican female lawmakers are pressured by their party and they may change their sponsorship on social welfare or feminist legislation in order to advance within the party (Hawkesworth, et al, 2001; Swers 2000). In the single member representative districts, female legislators may also feel pressure to represent their constituents (promissory representation) and the female group perspective may conflict with the constituents' demands.

There is significant research suggesting men and women differ in leadership styles. In general, females are found to be more approachable, trustworthy, and better communicators (Beck 1991; *Men and Women: Who's the Better Leader* 2008). They are also more interested in hearing and addressing constituent concerns (Fox and Shuhmann 1999; Thomas 1991, 1994). When women move into leadership roles, they may face a different, and more hostile, environment than men and they may not receive the same respect as men (Yoder 1991; Kathlene 1994). "Gender, as described and applied in this

literature, is a complex and interacting construct representing struggles over the use and definition of power, methods of managing conflict and building consensus, paths toward implementing change, and resistance by supporters of the status quo” (Kathlene 1994, 561). Females tend to lead more democratically, serve as a facilitator or moderator, and work toward consensus while men lead autocratically and are more controlling of discussion and debate (Kathlene 1991, 1994; Rosenthal 2002).

In summary, women are underrepresented in governing bodies and an increase in female lawmakers has resulted in more attention to female group salient issues. Women and men have differences of opinion on a wide range of political issues as well as how they prioritize these issues. Women may differ with each other on their opinions on political issues but, there are trends in the issues that women prioritize as most important. Men and women also vary in voting behavior, there are differences in their overall political party affiliation, and they differ in their behavior as elected officials. They are also found to have different styles of leadership. Therefore, what impact does the increase in the number of female lawmakers and their institutional incorporation in state legislatures across the United States have on public policy?

Robert Preuhs (2006) examined the issue of descriptive representation a different way in his work on minorities. He found that a number of different theories were supported when testing whether minorities had an effect on policy decisions of state legislatures. Prior to Preuhs work, studies found the strongest influence was with descriptive representation in local lawmaking bodies like school boards. He examined the number of minorities in the state legislature and also their incorporation into the

institution. For example, holding formal leadership positions like committee chair positions, majority or minority party leaders, or Speaker of the House and/or President of the Senate, led to minority lawmaker's influence on AFDC benefits. Further, he examined minority descriptive representation and how it is conditional on liberal governing coalitions. Liberal party platforms reflect preferences of minorities so descriptive representation did not make much difference (Browning, Marshall, Tabb 1984; Swain 1995). Previous work had not examined all the competing theories nor had they examined the conditioning effects of a liberal governing coalition and racialized political context.

Examining the impact of females in the state legislature dates back to the early 1970s when the number of women elected to the legislatures began to increase.¹ The addition of females allows research to focus on their impact on specific female group salient issues. The gender and representation literature has failed to examine all the competing theories of female descriptive representation and incorporation presented by Preuhs to determine where female representatives have the greatest influence on policy decisions.

Preuhs' work concluded with interesting results regarding minority descriptive representation on AFDC benefits in a state. Minorities did have influence outside of local governing bodies but their influence was conditioned by the racialized political context as well as party control in state legislatures (Preuhs 2006, 585). Given these findings, this study will replicate Preuhs' work using female representation and

¹ During this same period, women began to increase their presence in elected office in general.

incorporation as independent variables based on the models in his work. Women differ from one another in terms of race, socioeconomic background, education, etc. and they do not always agree on what constitutes women's interests (Hawkesworth 2001). This makes identifying female group salient issues challenging. But, evidence from public opinion polling and interviews of male and female legislators reveal trends in the gender gap in policy issues and differences in how males and females prioritize these issues. Based on the literature, the dependent variables selected to examine include issues traditionally supported and prioritized as important by females: education spending, child health insurance, welfare benefits, and child support payments.

Does the growth of female descriptive representation in the state legislature have an influence on these particular policy areas? Are females who are "incorporated" into the political institution, serving as committee chairs and in leadership positions in the state legislature, such as speaker of the house or majority leader, necessary to the outcome of these policies? Is being a member of the liberal governing coalition a condition for influence over these policy issues? Or, does the Democratic Party typically respond to these issues in governing bodies thus negating any additional female influence? These questions led to the research question for this work: Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues?

This research project will be examined through seven Chapters. Chapter II reviews the literature on descriptive representation with a discussion of its comparison to

substantive representation. This chapter discusses levels of government and support for female descriptive representation. Also, a discussion of issues typically most important to females in the population (female group salient issues) as well as female's legislative priorities will be discussed providing support for the selection of the four dependent variables. The dynamics of state legislatures, the hierarchy of leadership positions, and policymaking processes will be addressed and finally, females' leadership styles to show how an increase in the number of females in leadership positions could affect the dynamic of decision making in state legislatures.

Chapter III reviews the theoretical models used in this work: *The Presence Model*, the three institutional incorporation models -- *Simple Incorporation Model*, *Specific Institutional Incorporations Model*, and *Broad Institutional Incorporation Model* -- and the *Party as a Substantive Representative Model*. After developing these models as the basis for empirical analysis in my research, the hypotheses tested for each of the four dependent variables are presented: *per pupil education expenditures*, *children without health insurance*, *welfare benefits*, and *child support collection*. All the variables are discussed and support for their selection provided. Finally, the data utilized for this study is provided and the Ordinary Least Squared Model used to estimate the coefficients is explained.

Chapters IV through VII are devoted to one of the specific dependent variables in this study. The models are run on these dependent variables to test effects of female descriptive representation and incorporation. The results are presented to determine if support exists for the models. Chapter IV will reveal the results for the variable, *per*

pupil education expenditures, Chapter V, *child health insurance coverage*, Chapter VI, *welfare benefits*, and Chapter VII, *child support collection*. The final chapter will be a summary and discussion of the major findings in the work, the contribution this work has made to the literature, and concluding remarks about how this topic can be further expanded.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

“Representation is a core concept in the study and practice of politics. It is about *who* represents, *what* is represented, and *how* it is represented” (Galligan 2007, 557). If representation is core to how we study politics, then we must examine the individuals who represent us. Pitkin (1967) was one of the first to identify the four distinct, but interconnected, meanings or dimensions of representation: formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic. Descriptive representation, or “representativeness”, refers to the “compositional similarity between the representatives and the represented” (10-11) or meaning that the composition of the representative institution should mirror the composition of the represented. Substantive representation refers to “acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them (209).” The most common interpretation of this is that policy responsiveness should meet the needs or demands of citizens (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007).

While works cite Pitkin for her study of the integral parts of representation, many also ignore the concept that Pitkin believed these should be studied together and choose one or two parts to study (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007). This study specifically is interested in female descriptive representation and whether an increase in female representatives leads to substantive representation of female group salient issues. This study will not integrate the other theoretical approaches to studying representation, but it will incorporate more to the study of descriptive and substantive representation than has

been done in previous work by examining not only the number of female representatives, but also institutional leadership positions as well as the conditioning effect of political parties in state legislatures.

Gender politics literature has always stressed how important it is to elect more women to public office in order to adequately represent females and the political issues they find most important. Pitkin considered substantive representation to be the most important dimension of her model and numerous scholars still consider it to be a central focus to the study of representation. Growing evidence in the gender and representation literature leads to the conclusion that “female representatives, in particular, but not exclusively, have found to identify with promoting a more gender-equal society” (Galligan 2007, 557). Female legislators are more likely to promote legislation addressing women’s economic and social issues, especially issues concerning health care, poverty, and education (Carroll 1994; Dodson 1998; Flammang 1997; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991) and, in some cases, they take a different approach to legislating and leadership, communicating differently and working cooperatively with their male counterparts (Rosenthal 1998; Kathlene 1994; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994). Overall, women in public office are more likely to address political issues important to females in society and provide a different approach to legislating. This literature reveals that women better represent women. At the same time, there is research indicating electing women to office does not lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues. Women may act as isolated legislators and not represent the female “group perspective” (Phillips 1995; Weldon 2002). One of the goals of this research is

to show the female representative's role in promoting female group salient issues while recognizing other factors that affect policymaking at the state legislative level.

Males and females are politically different in a number of ways. Research of these differences has studied opinion differences, voting differences, and the gender gap. What does that mean to this study? This research is interested in male and female state legislators and the differences in their influence over policy. The literature review is organized around specific areas related to this focus to help better understand where we are today in studying male and female officeholders.

This chapter reviews the literature on descriptive versus substantive representation and the levels of government where females are influential. Secondly, female group salient issues and the differences between males and females' opinions of these issues are addressed. Third, female and male legislators' prioritization of political issues is discussed. Finally, the structure of state legislatures and policymaking is reviewed to understand the dynamics in how policy is formulated in state legislatures. This will lead to a discussion of differences in female leadership styles. Understanding state legislative policymaking and the hierarchy of decision making aids in understanding what women face as they increase their numbers and incorporation into the policymaking body and try to influence public policy.

DESCRIPTIVE V SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

As argued by John Stuart Mill more than a century ago and supported by Pitkin in her work on representation, the composition of the legislative body has an influence on policy outputs (1967). There is an importance between the percentage of females in

the legislature and public policy representing women's interests. A large amount of literature on women serving in the legislature focuses on descriptive versus substantive representation and the importance of the connection between the two (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Sapiro 1981). Research supports the argument that an increase in female representation will lead to an increase in substantive representation, or women will not only "stand for" women but also "act for" women (Pitkin 1967; Carroll 2000). This argument leads to a number of questions about whether females are better representatives of females and whether a female legislator acts for females inside and outside her respective district.

Mansbridge (1999) addresses these questions with a form of representation she calls "surrogate representation." Mansbridge suggests,

In practice, it seems that legislators' feelings or responsibility for constituents outside their districts are considerably stronger when the legislature features few, or disproportionately few, representatives of the group in question....The sense of surrogate responsibility is also particularly strong when the surrogate representative shares experiences with surrogate constituents in a way that a majority of the legislature does not (1988, 11).

She does not argue that surrogate representatives have to be descriptive representatives. However, she argues that descriptive representatives, being members of the subordinate group, help "circumvent the strong barriers to communication between dominant and subordinate groups" (1999, 642). In other words, female legislators act as better surrogates to females in society in general.

Female legislators express a commitment to representing women and their concerns. They also believe they are representatives of women and consider women as a group an important reelection constituency. These female legislators believe they are uniquely equipped to handle concerns from their female constituents (Reingold 1992). Female Congresswomen have reflected on their role and expressed a deep concern for women within and outside their constituency. Barbara Boxer (D-CA), once said in an interview "...women from all over the country really do follow what you do and rely on you to speak out for them on issues of women's health care, reproductive choice, condition of families, domestic priorities..." (1995). Eva Clayton, reflecting on her role as a U.S. Representative, said "I have women all over the state say, 'You are my congresswoman'...they identify with my presence here...and that adds, I think, an extraordinary opportunity, but I think it also adds a worthy burden that one has to be responsive [to] and responsible for" (1995). As Reingold suggests in her study of legislator's predispositions, "the female officials were more likely to accept the link between descriptive and substantive representation of women – the link between being a woman and actively representing women's concerns – than their male colleagues were to reject such a link" (1992, 531). The same is true for female state legislators. Most will do work aimed at helping women, and they will prioritize legislation that deals with women's issues. One of the challenges of this study is being able to define women's issues and address the question of whether all women care about the same issues. Female group salient issues, how they are identified, and priority women give to certain political issues are addressed in a later section of this chapter.

While there is evidence female lawmakers believe they better represent the female group perspective, there is also evidence that an increase in descriptive representation does not always increase substantive representation. Phillips (1995) makes the argument that increasing the number of women in elected office does not guarantee greater substantive representation because “representation depends on the continuing relationship between representatives and the represented” (82). For Phillips, there is no way to establish accountability to women as a group. Weldon argues female legislators act as “isolated individuals” and rely on their own experiences and opinions when making public policy decisions. Therefore, improving substantive representation would require that the representatives be able to “articulate the group perspective” (2002, 1157-58). Additionally, a number of surveys done of black legislators reveal no better responsiveness to black interests as a result of the increase in black descriptive representation (Hedge, Button, and Spears 1996; Critizer 1998; DeWeever 2000; Layman 1993).

While some results are mixed, female lawmakers have indicated through interviews and through the study of bill sponsorships they focus on substantively representing females in their state or throughout the nation. Representative Marge Roukema (R-NJ) “insisted that she ‘hadn’t wanted to’ take on women’s and family issues....she had ‘fought it’...I learned very quickly that if the women like me in Congress were not going to attend to some of these family concerns...they weren’t going to be attended to” (July 20, 1995; Carroll 2000). Carroll suggests that being a surrogate representative for women is what it means to be a female officeholder and this

responsibility is the norm, rather than the exception in this historical moment (2000). In 2001, lawmakers overwhelmingly said that the “increased presence of women has made a difference in the extent to which legislators consider how legislation will affect women as a group as well as in the number of bills passed dealing specifically with the problems faced by women” (“Women State Legislators” 2001).

While there is much evidence in the literature that female representatives better represent women’s political and public policy interests, other forms of representation can also explain how individuals are represented. Pitkin’s work identified two other types of representation, formal representation and symbolic representation. She believed that the study of representation included all four of the dimensions or an integrated structure of representation: formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic. Formal representation refers to the institutional rules and procedures related to the selection of representatives and symbolic representation refers to the feelings by those being represented. It does not matter who the representative is or what they do, it is all about how they are perceived and evaluated by who they represent. According to Pitkin, in order for an institution to be representative, it must achieve a minimum on all dimensions of representation (1967; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). In their work examining 31 representative democracies, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler find strong interconnections between these dimensions. The “formal representative structure and processes exert powerful influences on the extent of women’s descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and symbolic representation” (2005, 424). Further, while gains in policy responsiveness can be achieved with few women in office, “real” gains may be dependent on women

achieving a critical mass (Childs and Krook 2008; Kanter 1977; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). As the proportions within a group “begin to shift so do social experiences” because as their numbers increase, they can become allies, form coalitions, and affect the culture of the group (Kanter 1977, 207). Female lawmakers will not have considerable policy impact until they move from a few token legislators to a minority of all legislators. Only then women may be able to influence female group salient issues and influence their male colleagues to support the legislation (Childs and Krook 2008).

Other scholars have found an increase in the critical mass level may actually decrease a female’s likelihood to advocate on behalf of group salient issues (Carroll 2001). Further, studies reveal conditions that may lead to female legislators having policy success outside of simply reaching a certain percentage in the legislature, or a critical mass (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007). Identifying the threshold between numbers that are too small and too large is problematic as well as lack of evidence that just increases in numbers of female legislators will impact policy-making for female interests (Crowley 2004). Also, an increase in the number of women could create a backlash among their male colleagues, hinder bipartisan legislative work, or it could mean more women in the legislature who are not motivated to act for women (Carroll 2001; Childs and Krook 2008).

Mansbridge studied different types of representation and while she finds support for descriptive and substantive representation, she also argues that promissory representation has an impact on legislative behavior. Promissory representation is how she defines the traditional form of representation. Candidates make promises to

constituents during the campaign and then the representative is either able to keep or fail to keep these promises. To be accountable in promissory representation, the representative is “responsible to....answerable to...bound...bound by” those voters (Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967).

Level of Descriptive Representation Influence

There is a significant amount of scholarly work examining the level of government where descriptive representation has the most influence. Most of the work determining the influence of women on policy focused its attention on the states because more women serve as state legislators than as members of Congress. In multistate and longitudinal studies of single legislatures, the evidence indicates women do have more liberal policy attitudes and voting records than their male colleagues and they exhibit a greater commitment to the pursuit of feminist initiatives and legislation incorporating issues that traditionally concern women, such as health, education and welfare (Dolan and Ford 1995; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Thomas 1994).² Women are also more likely to make sure their policy proposals are passed into law (Thomas 1994). Findings also reveal that as women increased their numbers, the policy priority differences intensified. The more women in the legislature, the more likely they were to pursue policy based on gender. However, once this number reaches a “critical mass”, it appears that intensity wanes (Berkmann and O’Connor 1993; Thomas 1994). Some would argue that when women comprise more than 30 percent (sometimes the number needs to be at least 40 percent) they are too numerous to be considered a “cohesive group” and thus being

² A more detailed discussion of women’s group salient issues will be addressed in the next section.

female or male becomes less important to the legislators (Reingold 1992). In the case of state legislatures, women have not reached that level in the majority of the state legislatures since the overall average is only right above 20 percent. In a survey done in 2001, 85 percent of both Democrat and Republican female legislators agreed they have the responsibility to represent women's interests. These female representatives indicate they work on legislation intended to benefit women ("Women State Legislators" 2001). Therefore, it is clear female legislators feel that they should act for women, so this study is important because it can clearly test that notion to determine if the female legislators are doing this in the states.

There is much stronger evidence in support of descriptive representation with the study of local governing boards, specifically the study of race. Meier and Stewart (1991; see also Stewart, England and Meier 1989 and Meier, et al. 2005) found that the increase in black and Latino school board members led to an influence on public policy. This was due in part to the smaller size of the legislature, better policy measures at that governing level, and less structure, rules, and partisanship that are evident at the state legislative level that can undermine the minority influence. In an analysis of black legislators, the increase in the presence of blacks in the legislature neither affected their perceptions of having greater influence nor increased responsiveness to black interests (Critzler 1998; DeWeezer 2000; Layman 1993).³ Clearly, there is a greater complexity of the legislatures at the state and national level (Preuhs 2006) and with smaller

³ During the 1980s, the percentage of African Americans in the state legislatures increased to about 8 percent compared to a population of about 11-12 percent in the United States (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies and National Conference of State Legislatures, <http://www.ncsl.org>).

legislative bodies, the impact of one member will be greater (Meier, et al 2005).

Flammang (1985) in her study of county supervisors in Santa Clara, California, found women were more likely to speak out and participate in the policy-making process when there was a supportive colleague present, which is more likely to occur in a small governing body. Further, females were most likely to only pursue an issue on their legislative agenda if they felt they had enough support, rather than pushing an issue that was likely to fail.

At the national level, there is also support for descriptive and substantive representation. Women in Congress are sponsoring and co-sponsoring more legislation concerning women's roles as caregivers (Swers 2000; Vega and Firestone 1995) and they are using their positions on committees to advocate for female group salient issues into legislation (Dodson 1998; Swers 2000). Further, more female members of Congress are participating in floor debates on women's issues (Swers 2000; Dodson, et al. 1995). Some work, similar to the work in local governing bodies, has been done with what is referred to as new institutional research on Congress. Female members of Congress began adapting to the institutional norms in Congress and used them to enhance their policy priorities. They would use their positions on committees to make sure that gender related policies, like violence against women, reproductive rights, and women's health, did not fail because of lack of time for debate or funding for the issue (Dodson et al 1995). This research found the absence of women from the key committees dealing with women's issues inhibited women's efforts (Norton 1994, 1995, 1999). Further, by using their positions as party leaders, female members of Congress were able to make sure

their policy priorities got on the party's national agenda. There were cases, however, that other factors affected Congresswomen's actions and decision making. When examining the importance of majority versus minority party status, Republican female members of Congress changed their sponsorship on either social welfare bills or feminist policy in order to advance their position as a member of the majority party (Swers 2000).

Descriptive representation is not always popular in the literature. "No one would argue that morons should be represented by morons" (Pennock 1979, 314). Simply having a similarity or identity with constituents does not necessarily have anything to do with what the representative does and some have concluded that descriptive representation does little to support substantive representation of women (Diamond 1977; Swain 1993; Young 1997). In order to have a representative democracy, constituents' substantive interests must be represented. If "nondescriptive" representatives can best represent the substantive interests of their constituents, then descriptive representation does not have a leg to stand on (Mansbridge 1999). However, descriptive representation can provide political legitimacy making members of the historically underrepresented groups feel like they are being represented (Phillips 1995).

What we have learned from previous research is that the increase in the number of females and minorities in these governing bodies is important. But when the governing body is so large, like state legislatures, the numbers of female or minority representatives would have to increase more in order to see significant influence. Looking at historical trends, that is not likely to happen in the near future. The increase in the number of women in state legislative positions stopped in the late 1990s after two

decades of gains. The result is little change in the number of women in these governing bodies since that time but, women have gained seniority in these chambers and have increased their numbers in leadership positions (Carroll 2004). Therefore, rather than being concerned with numbers or just conducting interviews of these representatives, the obvious next step in research would be to look at the structure of the legislatures and the dynamics of power over legislation, as has been done somewhat with the studies on Congress.

The findings and explanation of different types of representation are important to this study because while it is a replication of another work, they have implications for future research in this area. This study will focus on only descriptive and substantive representation. Since in most states, the number of females in the legislatures across the country has not reached the critical mass level as suggested in the literature (Kanter 1977; Childs and Krook 2008), the representation of women's issues may be the result of the political parties taking up these issues or male legislators increasing their support of these issues to gain more support from female voters. Further, this study is not addressing formal and symbolic representation but as Pitkin suggests, these four dimensions may need to be addressed together to get the full effects of female representation. Also, with this work, campaign promises or legislative agenda of the representative is not accounted for but could have implications for future research in this area. What is interesting about this study is while there is support in the literature for female descriptive representatives, this study can test the assertion that nondescriptive representatives may best represent their constituents. If the number of female

legislators, the female committee chairs, and females in leadership positions don't have influence on female group salient issues, maybe the male representatives are addressing those concerns.

During the 1990s and early 2000s, women made inroads into leadership positions in the state legislatures. By 2003, about 13 percent of all top legislative leadership positions in state legislatures and almost 19 percent of standing committee chairs across the country were held by women (Carroll 2004). It is at that point, one can determine whether the influence is coming from the number of females or their institutional power they possess. There are so many factors in the state legislatures that can lead to policy influence and it is important to examine a number of these, as Preuhs did in his work, in order to determine how best female group salient issues can be addressed. It is important to dig deeper into the role of the institutional structure and conditional affects that party plays in the policymaking process.

FEMALE GROUP SALIENT ISSUES

In the nineteenth century, "male politicians argued that they knew what was in women's best interest" so there was no need for women in politics (Hawkesworth 2001). In the 1960s, women's rights activists also argued that women had a fixed set of interests. However, women differ from one another in the population in terms of race, socioeconomic background, education, marital status, and party affiliation, just to name a few. Further, women do not always agree on what constitutes women's interests or female group salient issues which makes identifying these issues challenging (2001). There is, however, evidence from public opinions polling and interviews of male and

female legislators over the years revealing trends in the gender gap in policy issues and prioritization of these issues.

Carol Gilligan believed women had a distinctive voice based on relationship and caring: a “different voice” (1982b). Different than men, a woman approaches decision making by considering others. “The phrase ‘a different voice’ implies to some that women are a cohesive group that think and act alike despite class, race, and other status attributes...at a minimum, a different voice means being different from...men in a consistent, predictable way” (Kelly, Saint-Germain and Horn’s 1991, 19). Women possess many varied political interests but are also widely perceived as sharing common interests that are salient to women as a group (Sapiro 1981). One must recognize that women are a diverse group along lines of races, ethnicity, class, etc., and while they may not agree on exactly what women’s interests are, they are likely to have political opinions that are distinguishable from men (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2007). Through survey research over the years, women in society are found to favor social policies more than men, are more compassionate than men (Gilligan 1982a, 1982b), and are less driven by “pocketbook” concerns (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Welch and Hibbing 1992). “Women are more supportive of social spending; men of tax cutting” (Alvarez and McCaffery 2003, 16). In recent decades, especially during the time period of this study, women are more supportive of government programs, government action, and government intervention than men (*The Gender Gap* 1997; Schlesinger and Heldman 2000). Even women running for public office are perceived as being more competent than men in the areas of “improving our education system” and “dealing with

health problems” (Rosenwasser, et al. 1987; Shapiro 1981) and better at deadline with social issues than men (*Men or Women: Who’s the Better Leader?* 2008).

Surveys of government officials have consistently found that female legislators place higher priority than males on women, children and family issues and they will introduce bills that concern these issues (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Thomas 1991; Thomas and Welch 1991). Typically, women more strongly support government spending programs because of their more compassionate stance on issues than men (Gilligan 1982a, 1982b; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Men are much more often than women to prioritize issues dealing with business and economics (Thomas 1991; Thomas and Welch 1991). Previous research found a true gender gap in policy exists on social welfare spending and social issues (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Due to the female’s historically disadvantaged position in society, they tend to advocate for social programs designed to help women, and the underprivileged, and they will support a more activist government in these areas (Carroll 1988, 2003).⁴ Because of the female’s traditional role as the primary caregiver, they tend to be more sensitive than men to the consequences that social policies have for individuals (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995). For example, in reaction to Reagan’s domestic social policy in the 1980s (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Piven 1985), women believed the government had a responsibility to “provide services, ensure jobs and living standards, and health care” (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Gilens 1988, Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998). The support by females of social welfare spending programs was a result of the beneficiaries of these

⁴During the time period covered in this study, the literature reveals that females continue to advocate for programs designed to help these groups (1982-2002).

programs primarily being female. Further, Reagan's attempt to cut these programs, in order to reduce taxes, had much more appeal to males, thus resulting in a gender gap over these issues (Howell and Day 2000).

Equally important to consider is not only the attitudinal differences of males and females but also how much importance they place on particular issues where they differ (salience of the issue). Surveys of the general public illustrate these differences. Social welfare spending and social issues, and the salience of these issues, are found to be one of the strongest predictors of behavior for females and males, with females favoring social welfare spending more than males. Females are consistently different from males in their opinions of programs that help African-Americans and their desired level of government services (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Females identify more with other disadvantaged groups, including ethnic and racial minorities and are more supportive of public assistance for minorities than males (Cook and Wilcox 1991; Gilens 1987).

FEMALES' LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES

If one accepts the argument that female descriptive representation leads to substantive representation for females, we have to know how women prioritize policy issues and how they behave while serving in the legislature. In other words, what do they bring to the legislature that is different from men?

In interviews of legislators, they have identified their responsibilities and priorities with legislation. Women legislators give greater priority to women's issues than their male colleagues at both state and national levels, actively promote legislation to improve women's status in society, and focus their legislative attention on issues such

as health care, the welfare of family and children, and education (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 2003). In The Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP) 2001 study of male and female state senators and representatives, women legislators were found to be much more active than their male colleagues in promoting women's rights legislation ("Women State Legislators 2001; see also Vega and Firestone 1995). Female legislators revealed that their top priority bill's purpose was to expand women's opportunities and/or protect the rights of women, and further, significantly larger proportions of women than men worked on legislation to benefit women (Carroll 2003, 8-9).

There are studies comparing women in Congress and their role in Washington to what is known at the state level. Carroll (2000) examined the 103rd and 104th Congress and focused on the impact of members of Congress on various policy areas by interviewing members. Her results indicate that Congresswomen believed they had a responsibility to all women in order to best represent them and this opinion tends to be the "norm, rather than the exception" (11). She argues this attitude can do a lot for women's issues, largely because female members of Congress feel that they are "surrogate representatives" for women (11). This perception of her role affected her vote on policy issues. Dolan (1997) examined the 103rd Congress to determine whether female members of Congress responded to women through public policy. She also found support for female members of Congress being more supportive of women's issues than their male colleagues.

Why do female legislators give greater priority to women's issues than their male colleagues? Katzenstein shows feminism continues to exist and "women inside the major institutions of our society have found new strategies, tailored to their institutional context, to press forward with feminist demands" (1998). Rather than holding protests outside of governing institutions, women are now involved in feminist activities within the governing bodies. Carroll (2003) finds that many women legislators "are closely connected to networks that provide access to the ... group perspective" (1). Both feminist identity and women's organizations lead to greater accountability between women legislators and women in the electorate. Accountability to women's issues is also found in identity, or females being able to identify with other women as a group. Most feminists feel "internally accountable" to the women's movement (Carroll 2003, 2), which is not a set of organizations but more of a "discourse" (Mansbridge 1995). Mansbridge defines this as "a set of changing, contested aspirations, and understandings that provide conscious goals, cognitive backing, and emotional support for each individual's evolving feminist identity" (1995, 27). She believes accountability to the women's movements/discourse through identity is different from descriptive representation because it requires women thinking collectively, and thinking in terms of the group perspective is important to substantive representation. This is important because it reinforces "feminist identity" and supports "women legislators' policy-related actions on behalf of women" (Carroll 2003, 3).

What about female lawmakers who do not consider themselves feminists? Carroll addresses this issue with her reference to a "closet feminist" (1984). She argues

that female lawmakers are committed to women's issues and goals of the women's movement but are less likely to make that public while campaigning because it may be a liability to them and it may narrow their appeal. While all women may not label themselves as feminist, many will share those goals (Carroll 2003). In a study of Congress in the mid-1990s, Hawkesworth, et al, found that "Democratic and Republican women legislators of widely differing ideological views and representing markedly different constituents seek to promote legislation they believe will serve women and are willing to cooperate across party lines to accomplish their legislative objectives for women" (2001, 4). Typically, Democratic female legislators are more likely to work on advancing women's issues. But, even as recent as 1988, Republican female legislators were more likely than Democratic female legislators to work on legislation to help women ("Women State Legislators" 2001).

Other factors may affect a female lawmaker's actions and decision making which can conflict with their goals to advance women's issues. Recent work of Republican female members of Congress revealed that they will change their sponsorship on either social welfare bills or feminist policy in order to advance their position as a member of the majority party (Swers 2000). Further, in a highly ideologically polarized political environment, collaboration between Democratic and Republican female legislators can be hindered. For example, in the 104th Congress (1995-1996), the new Republican majority was less sympathetic to bipartisan action among female lawmakers, they had fewer ties with women's rights groups outside of Congress, and they eliminated the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues (Hawkesworth, et al, 2001).

There is also the evidence of promissory representation when females must be accountable to their constituents and campaign promises. If that theory is supported, supporting the female group perspective may conflict with constituent demands. These factors have implications for this research and future research in the area of female descriptive representation to be discussed in the conclusion.

DYNAMICS OF STATE LEGISLATURES AND HIERARCHY OF LEADERSHIP

Comparative analysis of state legislatures is relatively easy in the United States since almost all states have the same basic structure. A brief description of the dynamics of state legislatures, the hierarchy of leadership, and an explanation of policymaking will help set the stage for the discussion of female leadership style and how it differs from males.

Individuals and groups can gain influence over legislation in two ways. First, by being appointed to a powerful position and secondly, by being appointed to and participating in committee work (Endersby and McCurdy 1996; Kathlene 1994). Each state legislative branch is structured to provide a hierarchy of leaders.⁵ With the House of Representatives, the members select a Speaker of the House who not only presides over the legislation session, but in many states, has a very powerful position for a number of reasons. First, the speaker helps select, or in some cases exclusively selects, the chair and membership on standing committees in the house. These standing committees are the groups of people who determine the fate of a piece of legislation. In some states, up to ninety percent of bills die in committee so the members who serve

⁵ The titles of leaders can vary by state and the discussion provided is describing the state legislative leadership in general terms.

have a very important role (Tanahill 1995). Therefore, naming the members on the committee and the chair can give the speaker a lot of influence over legislation. All members know that “being in good graces of the party leader is certainly important in getting on major committees” (Goodwin 1959). Secondly, the speaker, in many states, assigns members to a calendar committee, which determines when a bill will be scheduled (or if it will be scheduled) for debate. In some states, the speaker serves as the individual who does the scheduling. Either way, this is an additional layer of influence over legislation. Finally, the speaker of the house can determine whether a bill will be debated on the house floor. The Speaker is almost always a member of the majority party in the house so his or her responsibilities, as well as the support from his or her party, can garner much influence over legislation (Tannahill 2005).

Assisting the speaker with his or her duties is the assistant speaker of the house and speaker pro tem, who presides over the house debate in place of the speaker. These two individuals can also be very helpful to the speaker and be an ally in helping him or her push forth their policy agenda. The majority leader also serves to assist the speaker in shoring up support from their party to help successfully pass legislation or help ensure that bills do not pass the house. The minority leader in the senate serves the minority party (Tanahill 2005).

The Senate operates in a similar fashion as the house but since the senate is typically smaller in number, it is a less structured legislative body, less formal with rules and procedures, and seniority and specialization norms are not frequently enforced, thus giving leaders in the senate less power over legislation (Endersby and McCurdy 1996).

The lieutenant governor is typically elected as the leader of the senate and is very influential over legislation. He or she typically has the same responsibilities as the speaker but since it is an elected position, he/she does not necessarily serve as the leader of the party. He does usually have the power to appoint committee members and chairs and determine if legislation will be debated on the senate floor, etc. The president of the senate is the position held by the leader of the party and selected by senators. He or she typically presides over the senate debate and may have a role in assigning committee membership and chairs (Tanahill 2005). To assist the president of the senate, the president pro-tem helps with the responsibilities. Also, majority leaders serve in the same role for the senate as the majority leader in the house. The minority leader in the senate serves the minority party (Tanahill 2005).

State Legislative Policymaking

“Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work” (Wilson 1913, 79). As mentioned, being appointed to a committee and participating in committee work gives legislators great influence over legislation and control over their legislative agenda (Endersby and McCurdy 1996; Kathleen 1994; Munger 1988). Both the full committee and subcommittee work has been recognized by state and congressional scholars as being extremely important to the legislative process (Evan 1991; Francis 1989). Francis (1982, 1989) did comparative work on the fifty states and found similarities among them. The House and the Senate, despite the institutional norms, have much in common. Legislative work is done in committee, the committee specializes in a certain policy area, and members work for assignments to certain committees to help them control the

policy, advance their agenda, and accomplish their legislative goals (Endersby and McCurdy 1996; Munger 1988; Schiller 1995). Legislators spend the majority of their time working with legislation as opposed to constituency service or legislative oversight (Masters 1961; Francis 1989). The main focus is committee work and sponsoring legislation. Committee work tends to take up the majority of the legislator's time due to the volume of legislation that must pass through committee. Members' policy interests as well as their institutional influence and ambition for higher office can influence their goals in getting on certain legislative committees (Fenno 1973; Hibbing 1986). Members work hard to gain favor with the leadership in the House and the Senate in order to be appointed to certain committees, especially the powerful ones (Masters 1961).

The committee system is devised to do most of the work in state legislatures. Once the membership and chair are in position, any bill that is introduced into the house or senate is assigned by the chamber leadership to one of these committees, who has jurisdiction over the topic of the legislation. For example, education bills would be assigned to the education committee. However, some committees have overlapping jurisdictions so the chamber leadership would have the ability to assign a bill to a "friendly" or "unfriendly" committee (Ginsberg, Lowi and Weir 2011, 844) giving the chamber leader significant power over legislation. The reason these committees become so important is they do most of the work on the bill. First, they have the power to amend or re-write the legislation. Technically, it could go to the committee "looking" one way and come out looking totally different. Typically this is done by amending the

legislation to make changes any way the committee sees fit. Secondly, the committee is able to hold hearings on the bill and ask anyone they want to hear from to testify in favor of or in opposition to the bill. So, if the chair supports the bill, he/she may ask individuals supporting the bill to testify in hopes of influencing the committee membership. If he/she opposes the bill, the same thing may happen with individuals opposed to the legislation. Finally, the committee takes the vote to determine whether the bill will move out of committee. As will be discussed further in the next section, women approach leadership in different ways and have different styles of leadership which can be a factor when determining a female legislator's influence over committee work. Kathlene (1990, 1991) found that female committee chairs were most likely to use their position as a facilitator of committee discussion rather than trying to control or direct the debate. Therefore, whether giving women this position of power on a committee yields great influence over legislation will be addressed in this study.

The entire legislative structural dynamic is set up so the majority party generally holds the power. First, the majority party holds the most seats thus giving them the most votes. Second, the majority party typically selects the leadership for the chamber who is responsible for the path of legislation. Third, the leadership selects the committee membership and chair and assigns the bills to committee, thus being able to "stack the deck" in their favor. Finally, the fate of a bill being placed on the chamber calendar for debate and vote is greatly influenced by the leadership in the chamber.

This structure leads to a great amount of influence over legislation. This explanation is important to this research because the question of female influence is

driving this study. Would females holding these positions attempt to influence legislation that is typically important to females in society? With the increase in female legislators, more females are holding these important positions in the legislature, thus increasing their chances of being influential over legislation. Further, females are found to have different leadership styles than their male counterparts exerting additional influence. The purpose of this study is to examine all the areas of influence given this legislative structure.

Female Leadership Styles

When examining female leadership styles, one must look at the bigger picture of perceptions of the legislators' role. Research indicates at the state and local level, female officials are perceived as being more responsive to constituents, more approachable, trustworthy, and better at communicating (Beck 1991; Flammang 1995) and appear more interested in hearing constituent input and addressing constituent concerns (Fox and Shuhmann 1999; Thomas 1991, 1994). Further, if one examines bills that are a top priority for legislators⁶, the passage rate can be significantly higher female legislators than a bill of similar importance introduced by their male colleague (Thomas 1991). Women are exerting a greater level of effort and energy than men into the passage of legislation most important to them. Therefore, one can expect that leadership styles would also be different given the perceptions of their overall role.

⁶ In Thomas and Welch's study (1991), the top priority bills were those identified by lawmakers as their top priority and bills they felt most proud of when asked about accomplishments (as well as committee assignments even though that is not completely voluntary).

In a legislature, individual lawmakers obtain influence through their appointment/election to leadership positions and through their appointment and participation in committee work. Therefore, as more women move into these roles, they will have the opportunity to set the agenda and influence public policy on certain types of issues, possibly those important to women (Thomas and Welch 1991; Carroll 2003). Research shows women moving into leadership positions have faced a different environment than men (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Flammang 1985). While the assumption would be that women would have advantages in these new roles, as their male colleagues had previously, research finds that female chairs did not always receive the same respect or influence in committee hearings as men (Yoder 1991; Kathlene 1994). Women used their leadership positions to include all voices while men interjected their own personal opinions and would try to dominate the discussion by cutting off speakers (Kathlene 1995; Walsh 2002). Further, with an increase in females serving on the committees, the environment may actually become more hostile toward women because of this lack of respect and perceived influence (Yoder 1991). This could obviously lead to a disadvantage in policymaking by female lawmakers. “Gender, as described and applied in this literature, is a complex and interacting construct representing struggles over the use and definition of power, methods of managing conflict and building consensus, paths toward implementing change, and resistance by supporters of the status quo” (Kathlene 1994, 561).

Research demonstrates women moving into leadership positions over the past few decades have different leadership styles than men (Dodson and Carroll 1991;

Flammang 1985; *Men of Women: Who's the Better Leader?* 2008; Rosenthal 2002). Female committee chairs do not perceive their leadership positions the same as their male colleagues. Females tend to lead more democratically, are likely to use their position as a facilitator or moderator rather than trying to control discussion and debate, and are more oriented toward consensus. Men tend to lead more autocratically and attempt to control testimony, witnesses, and debate (Kathlene 1991, 1994, 1995; Rosenthal 2002). Further, the perception of leadership traits also differs among men and women. As leaders, women are perceived by the public to be more honest, intelligent, and compassionate. Women are also are perceived to be better in public office at working our compromise, keeping government honest, representing constituent interests, and standing up for what they believe in (*Men of Women: Who's the Better Leader?* 2008). While this study will examine both committee chairs and female leaders in the state legislature to determine their policy influence, it will not measure leadership style. However, the findings could lead to a discussion of female leadership style in the concluding chapter.

WHAT REMAINS TO BE STUDIED

Questions remain from the literature on descriptive representation and its influence leading to the research question for this work. Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues?

As noted in previous works, an increased presence of females or minority lawmakers does not always increase the legislative responsiveness to that group's interests (Layman 1993; Phillips 1995; Hedge, Button, and Spears 1996; Critizer 1998; DeWeever 2000) even though female legislators claim to work on those group salient issues (Carroll 2003; Mansbridge 1995, 1999). There is a missing element in those studies that does not consider the mechanisms of influence or conditional effects present in the given legislature suppressing this group influence.

Preuhs (2006) conducted an important study on the conditional effects of minority descriptive representation in the state legislatures. He revealed the positive influence of black legislators on state welfare benefit levels. Preuhs believed previous works on black officeholders, which showed no impact, did not examine the mechanisms of influence of minority lawmakers. He found that the presence of black legislators is not the only means of influencing policy, but he also found blacks serving as committee chairs and in leadership positions was a necessary condition for the influence of policy. Additionally, when the Democratic Party was in control of the legislature, there was less recognizable influence of black legislators because liberal non-black legislators have similar policy preferences. Therefore, the influence of black legislators was conditioned by the presence of a liberal governing coalition. Finally, all of these "mechanisms are conditioned by the racialization of the political context" (585). When racial polarization dominates the political context, the mechanisms that would typically lead to policy influence are not present. Policy preferences are reinforced by

racial cleavages and minority members' views are marginalized by nonminority lawmakers (Preuhs 2006; Hawkesworth 2003).

Preuhs' work is unique, and the first of its kind, because it goes beyond the study of black descriptive representation and their policy influence and/or their influence in local governing bodies. He argues that previous work did not account for the conditional effect of racialized political context and majority coalition membership. He finds institutional positions at the state legislative level, leads to greater influence of minority legislators on policy issues than simply their presence in the legislature. If one can find this influence with black representatives, the obvious next step would be to determine if these institutional and conditional effects are similar when examining female representation.

This work will replicate much of Preuhs' work by studying the conditional effects of female descriptive representation in the state legislature from 1983-2002 when all the states experienced a sharp increase in the number of female representatives with a leveling off in the mid-1990s (see the figure on page 46). Since this study combines the influence of female descriptive representation with institutional mechanisms and conditioning effects, examining this time period is beneficial because as the number of females increased in the legislatures, the number of females serving as committee chairs and in leadership positions also increased (see the figures on pages 50 and 51).

Therefore, this study is important and adds to the literature because it turns to state level data and accounts for all mechanisms of influence, as well as conditional effects of a liberal governing coalition, to determine whether female descriptive

representation exerts policy influence. This influence may be with the presence of females in the legislature, females serving as committee chairs, females serving in institutional leadership positions (i.e. majority party leader, Speaker of the House, and/or Senate President), and the conditional effects of a majority governing coalition (the Democratic party control of the governorship and legislature in the state).

Since this is a replication of Preuhs' study using gender instead of race, this study will replicate his models and hypotheses in order to determine whether the findings hold with gender. At the same time, a number of different issues are not covered in his study that could provide more explanation on the influence of female legislators on female group salient issues.

CONCLUSION

As the literature reveals, there is a need to study female descriptive representation and its effect on substantive representation of female group salient issues. The literature reveals the importance of females in governing bodies and their influence on policy outputs. At the same time, there are scholars who find that female descriptive representation is not the most important type of representation to examine to determine if people are being represented. Also, some research suggest that females act as isolated individuals and don't represent the group perspective and pressure from political party leadership may lead female lawmakers away from representing women.

Since females have increased their numbers in state legislatures over the past few decades, the time frame for this study is important. While female increases at the state legislative level has flat-lined since the late 1990s, we have seen increases in the number

of females who are serving in leadership positions and an increase in the number of female committee chairs. The literature on state government hierarchy of leadership and dynamics of policymaking indicates individuals in party leadership roles and as committee chairs are important for influence over policy. Therefore, studying not only the increase in females in state legislatures but also the increase in their roles in leadership positions and committee chairs, will help explain how much influence they can have and that has not been done before.

The following chapter will discuss the model and hypotheses tested for this study as well as explain the variables and data used. Four empirical chapters will follow examining the results of the four dependent variables followed by a concluding chapter.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES

This study is a replication of previous work done by Robert Preuhs (2006), so the models and hypotheses are very similar. The difference in this work is the independent variable using gender as its basis rather than race, but the same theory is applicable. This chapter will outline the theoretical models for this study, identify the data and describe the independent and dependent variables, and define the model used to estimate the coefficients.

THEORETICAL MODELS

Preuhs presented a number of different theoretical models in his work of how racial and ethnic descriptive representation is linked to policy influence (2006). These same theoretical models will be used in this work as well as hypotheses derived from these models to determine how female descriptive representation is linked to policy influence. In the case of this work, “descriptive representation refers to the representation of groups by individuals who share the same physical characteristics” (Preuhs 2006: 586; Pitkin 1967).

The Presence Model


The *presence model* is the basic model developed to study descriptive representation and policy influence. The model assumes (in the case of this study) female legislators act as stronger advocates for women’s interests than male legislators because they share unique experiences and backgrounds with female constituents

(Preuhs 2006; Bratton and Haynie 1999). Paraphrasing Preuhs, adding female representatives “fosters governmental responsiveness to [women’s] groups by increasing the level of advocacy for their interests” (Preuhs, 2006, 586). Preuhs reveals evidence in support of the *presence model* with minority representation found at the local school board level studying black and Latino board members. The support of this model and increased responsiveness on issues is due to the smaller size of the legislatures, better policy measures at that level, and less structure, rules, and partnerships than at the state legislative level (Meier and Stewart 1991; Stewart, England and Meier 1989; Meier, et al. 2005; Meier 2008). Simply, there is greater complexity of the legislatures at the state level (Preuhs 2006). Preuhs revealed numerous studies have been done surveying black legislators and studying responsiveness to black interests and none reveal better policy responsiveness as a result of an increase in black descriptive representation (Hedge, Button, and Spears 1996; Critzer 1998; DeWeever 2000; Layman 1993). The *presence model* will be tested using female descriptive representation in this study. Further, since the *presence model* did not perform well outside local governing boards, other models will be tested to determine how female descriptive representation is linked to policy influence, specifically mechanisms of support and conditioning effects.

To demonstrate the increased “presence” of females in elected office, Figure 1 reveals the increase in females serving in the state legislature at the time of this study, the 1980s through the early 2000s. Throughout the 1980s, the proportion of females in the state legislatures sharply increased with a leveling off after the 1990s (see Figure 1). In the early 1970s, females constituted about 4-5% of the state legislative membership

with a doubling of the percentage by the late 1970s. Another interesting trend is the variation in the number of female legislators in each state. In 2004, for example, 9.4

FIGURE 1 FEMALE STATE LEGISLATORS, 1983-2002



Note: Values represent mean percentage of female legislators by year. N=980 (49 states, 20 years, NE excluded). Source: Center for American Women and Politics.

percent of the legislature in South Carolina was female while females held 36.7 percent of the seats in the State of Washington. Many of the lower percentages are in southern or border states. Scholars who have examined the different patterns of representation among females in the states have found no simple explanation of this occurrence

(Norrande and Wilcox 1998). While there are a lot of similarities among state legislatures (leadership structure, committee structure, lawmaking process), there are a number of differences among the state legislatures (session length, number of committees, use of subcommittees, etc.) which complicates the comparative analysis. State legislatures also exhibit a high degree of stability and uniformity, as seen in committee work, legislation sponsorship, and the role of standing committees, which aids in the testing of the models in this work (Jewell 1989; Francis 1989; Patterson 1996). Most state legislatures are very partisan bodies with a hierarchical partisan structure with top party leaders and secondary leaders serving as committee chairs and members. Further, the standing committees are the principal work groups for the legislature and appointments to committees are made by house speakers and senate presidents based on preferences of members and the leaders' strategic calculations.

Models of Incorporation

The Simple Incorporation Model. In order for female lawmakers to be influential over policy decisions, they must "be incorporated into the dominant political regime" (Preuhs 2006: 596 from Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). In the *simple incorporation model*, being part of the majority party is a necessary condition for female lawmakers' influence over policy. Support for this model was found in a study of city council and minority hiring practices when black council members were also members of the majority coalition (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). In this work, female

lawmakers who are part of the majority (party) coalition⁷ will be examined to determine if that is a condition for policy influence of female legislators.

The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model. The *specific institutional incorporation model* assumes females who hold formal positions of power, like serving as committee chairs, are more likely to influence specific policy issues. This model goes beyond the simple incorporation model and asserts “institutional incorporation is another possible mechanism for influence, particularly in state and national legislative settings” (Preuhs 2006; Haynie 2001; Nelson 1991). This model holds lawmakers who hold formal leadership positions, like the committee chairs who deal with specific policy issues, will exert additional policy influence. Figure 2 shows the increase in the number of female committee chairs in the state legislatures from 1983-2002. The legislative structure is different in a number of states but there are a number of commonalities like committee work and sponsorship of legislation being a legislator’s top priority (Francis 1989) which lends itself to the study of this model. In this study, an increase in the number of females who serve as committee chairs should be correlated with female group salient issues and the passage of legislation and/or increases in funding, etc. related to these issues. One can see by the Figure there was a sharp increase in female committee chairs which should result in greater influence over public policy important to females.


The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model. Similar to the *specific institutional incorporation model*, the *broad institutional incorporation model* asserts females

⁷ The term majority coalition as used by Preuhs is the same as majority party in the state legislature.

holding formal positions of power, like speaker of the house, senate president and/or lieutenant governor, or majority or minority leader, can exert power over a wide range of policy issues (Preuhs 2006). Figure 3 reveals the increase in the number of females in leadership positions from 1983-2002. These positions include speaker of the house, assistant speaker of the house, president pro tem of the house, president of the senate⁸, president pro tem of the senate, and the majority and minority leaders in both the house and the senate. Preuhs reveals the evidence of these two incorporation models is mixed. Research has found a negative relationship between proportion of leadership positions held by black lawmakers and public expenditures in a variety of programs (Nelson 1991). However, some work has found a positive relationship between an index of incorporation, which is based on broad indicators of representation as well as institutional positions held by African Americans, and expenditures for black interest policies (Haynie 2001). Since little research has been done in this area, it is an important factor to study. In the case of this study, females in leadership positions began to steadily increase in the 1980s through the 2000s. Given the influence the leadership in state legislatures has on legislation and its passage, one would believe an increase in females may lead to more attention to legislation important to females. Therefore, we expect this increase in females in leadership roles in the state legislature will result in greater influence over public policy important to females.

⁸ In Preuhs' work, he did not use the lieutenant governor as one of the leadership positions in Senate because it is an elected statewide position rather than selected by the Senate membership. However, in many states, the lieutenant governor has significant influence over committee member and chair appointments and referring legislation to committee. As discussion of the inclusion of other leadership positions will be addressed in the conclusion.

FIGURE 2 FEMALE STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1983-2002




Note: Values represent the total number of females who served as committee chairs. N=1000 (50 states, 20 years). Committee chairs were reported differently in 2002 explaining the drop in the number of female chairs. Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff*.

The Party as Substantive Representative Model. Many times liberal non-female party lawmakers will represent women's interests. Therefore, if the Democratic Party is in control of the legislature, women's policy preferences may be advanced with or without female descriptive representation (Preuhs 2006). This is an important mechanism to consider in this study dealing with the effects of descriptive representation. While there has been an increase in the number of Republican female legislators, the majority of the females serving in the state legislatures have been members of the Democratic Party and that number has continued to increase. At the

same time, most of the push for female issues originated with the Democratic Party.


Therefore, the influence on policy when the Democrats are the majority party may have less to do with the presence of female in the legislature more to do with the Democratic Party in power.

FIGURE 3 FEMALES IN STATE LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, 1983-2002



Note: Values represent the total number of females in formal leadership positions in the state house and senate. N=1000 (50 states, 20 years). These positions include speaker of the house, speaker pro tem of the house, assistant speaker of the house, president of the senate, president pro tem of the senate, and majority and minority leaders in the house and the senate. Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committee, and Staff*.

**FIGURE 4 DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONTROL OF STATE
LEGISLATURES 1983-2002**




Note: Graph represents the mean percentage of state legislative seats held by the Democratic Party. N=980 (49 states, 20 years, NE excluded). Source: State Politics and Policy data set.

Figure 4 reveals the percentage of Democrat state legislatures during the years of this study. While the percentage has decreased over the years, the mean has been above 50 percent. In terms of this study, we expect to see female legislators' influence on policy reduced when the Democratic party is the majority party. A variable will be used in the models to act as a proxy for liberal governing coalition – *Unified Democratic Government* (Democratic Party control of both the governor and legislature). As a result, the decrease in the percentage of seats held by Democrats results in an increase in

influence by female legislators over policy issues important to females. In Preuhs' work, he did not account for political party of the legislators because in the case of blacks, the overwhelming majority is affiliated with the Democratic Party. According to Figure 5, the majority of females in the state legislatures during the time of this study are also members of the Democrat Party. At the same time, there is a steady increase in Republican female legislators. With the exception of a few years (1985-1986 and 1995-1996), the gap between female Democratic and Republican legislators has been consistent at approximately 20.5 percent. In the last few years of this study, the gap increased to 22 percent. Since this study is a replication of Preuhs' work, the political party affiliation of females will not be controlled for in the model. However, it could be an important discussion depending on the results of the model. For example, if the number of females is increasing in number in the state legislatures and the majority of these females are members of the Democratic Party, would the Democrats be making changes and supporting policy to appeal to this increase in females? Further, is the Democratic Party doing more to attract female voters and potential female candidates by addressing female group salient issues? The implications of party affiliation will be addressed in the empirical chapters and in the conclusion.

FIGURE 5 FEMALES IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE BY POLITICAL PARTY, 1983-2002



Note: Values represent the total number of female Democratic and Republican state legislators. N=980 (49 states, 20 years, NE excluded). Source: Center for American Women and Politics.

HYPOTHESES

These theories suggest there are a number of mechanisms and conditions through which female legislators influence public policy important to females. The following hypotheses are derived from the theoretical models and provide the foundation for the empirical analysis of this study (adapted from Preuhs 2006). Each hypothesis will be examined for each of the four policy areas.

H1 (*The Presence Model*): Female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies.

H2 (*The Simple Incorporation Model*): When female representatives are members of the governing coalition,⁹ female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies.

H3 (*The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model*): When female representatives hold positions of power¹⁰ over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies..

H4 (*The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model*): Female control of formal leadership positions¹¹ is positively associated with policies favoring women's interests.

H5 (*The Party as Substantive Representative Model*): When parties that share the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females.

As previously noted, research has found the true gender gap in public opinion exists on social welfare spending, social issues, and the use of force/violence issues and

⁹ The governing coalition in this study refers to females members of the majority party in the legislature.

¹⁰ Positions of power in this study refer to females serving as committee chairs with jurisdiction over issues of education, child support, welfare expenditures, and child health insurance programs.

¹¹ Formal leadership positions in this study include speaker of the house, assistant speaker of the house, president pro tem of the house, president of the senate, president pro tem of the senate and majority and minority leaders of the house and senate. Legislators in these formal leadership positions have power over a wider range of policy issues through the use of agenda setting and logrolling (Preuhs 2006). See Appendix for descriptive statistics.

these issues tend to be the strongest predictors of behavior for men and women (Kaufman and Petrocik 1999). Based on these differences in public opinion, I have selected four different policy measures to assess the effect of female descriptive representation in the state legislatures on female group salient issues: *per pupil education expenditures in constant dollars, percentage of children without health insurance, welfare benefits, and percentage of child support collected*.

There is growing literature revealing gender differences in fiscal policies in America. While men and women find education an important issue, they will differ in whether they would support education spending over tax cuts. Men would give first priority to tax cuts while women would support an increase in education spending (Alvarez and McCaffery 2000), which relates back to the attitude and salience models proposed by Kaufman and Petrocik (1999). When asked about their attitude toward education and spending, men would be supportive but when asked about the importance (salience) of this issue over other fiscal policy (tax cuts), men would not typically support educational policy issues while women would prioritize that issue.

Females tend to advocate for social programs designed to help the underprivileged and will support a more activist government in these areas (Carroll 1988), and they are more sensitive than men to the consequences social policies have for individuals (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995). Women believe the government has a responsibility to “provide services, ensure jobs and living standards, and health care (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Gilens 1988, Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998).

Therefore, the issues of welfare benefits and rate of children's health insurance coverage will be examined in this work.

Additionally, males are in dispute with females about the issue of "big government" (Carroll 1988; Kaufman and Petrocik 1999) and they are more driven by "pocketbook" concerns (Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Welch and Hibbing 1992). Females are more compassionate about and more concerned for the underprivileged than males (Carroll 1988; Gilligan 1982a, 1982b) so we expect to see females in the state legislature supporting these issues.

Finally, women are more active on the issue of child support because it benefits women as a class and because most individuals seeking support are female and women's interest groups are more active on child support issues (Keiser and Meier 1996).¹² Keiser and Meier (1996) examined the issue of child support with bureaucrats and found passive representation (descriptive representation) leads to active representation, having discretion to advocate the interests of the constituents served. Keiser finds gender is a salient issue for bureaucrats when the policy benefits women as a class.

Since females are more concerned for the disadvantaged in society and for children, are more compassionate than men on many of these issues, we expect a positive relationship between female descriptive representation and public policy on these issues.

¹² League of Women Voters and American Association of University Women, as examples (see Crowley 2003).

DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The data for this study is based on a pooled time series cross sectional data set, covering 50 states over a twenty year period from 1983-2002 for a total of 1000 cases. In most of the analysis, the total number of cases will vary. For example, AK, HI and NE are excluded because of lack of data for all variables and in the case of NE, the one house legislative body prevents an accurate analysis compared to states with a two house legislative body. There were also some dependent variables selected and data were not available for all years. Those variables will be discussed in the next section.

A number of sources were used to collect data for this study. First, the United States Census Data were used for a number of variables in the dataset. Second, Preuhs' data on welfare spending in the 1980s, and child support payment data in the 1980s and 1990s from Kaiser's work, were used in this work. Third, the *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* State Data set is utilized for a number of independent and dependent variables. Fourth, The Center for American Women in Politics (CAWP) at Rutgers University was used to gather data on the number of females in the legislature and females in leadership positions. Fifth, *The State Legislative Leadership Committees and Staff* handbooks are utilized to collect data for female committee chairs and leadership positions held by females in the state legislatures from 1983-2002. Finally, the U.S. Bureau of the Census data were utilized.

*Dependent Variables*¹³

The dependent variables for this study include *per pupil education expenditures in constant dollars, percentage of children without health insurance, welfare benefits, and percentage of child support collected.*

Per pupil education expenditures in constant dollars is the amount spent on education per student by year. The expectation is female representation and incorporation increases in state legislators, will influence the increase in educational expenditures. The *State Politics and Policy* state dataset reported these expenditures utilizing U.S. Census data.

The variable *percentage of children without health insurance* is measured by the percentage of uninsured children in a state by year, which is expected to decrease with focused attention on this policy area by female legislators and leadership. The U.S. Bureau of the Census did not begin reporting child health insurance coverage rates until 1987 which is the start date for data analysis.

Welfare benefits is measured by the average monthly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cash benefit levels by year. In the mid-1990s, AFDC changed to Temporary Aid to Need Families (TANF) which will be explained in more detail in Chapter VII. As females increase their presence and leadership role in state legislators, welfare benefits will increase. Data from Preuhs' work were used and additional data was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.

¹³ See Appendix for descriptive statistics and explanation of coding.

Finally, the variable *percentage of child support collected* is measured by the percentage of voluntary child support payments collected by year. The underlying assumption in this work is female lawmakers will seek higher levels of funding, benefits, and/or more attention to these public policy issues than male lawmakers. Lael Keiser has done extensive research in child support and her dataset for the years 1983-1991 was utilized for this study. Additional data was not collected after 1991 because the U.S. Census Bureau's collection of these state data changed and consistent numbers were unavailable.

Independent Variables

The independent variables for this study include *percent female legislators*, *percent female committee chair*, *female institutional incorporation*, and *unified Democratic government* (of executive and legislative branches). Control variables include *percent Democratic legislators*, *citizen liberalism*, *political competition index*, *income*, *poverty*, and *female labor force participation*¹⁴.

The *percent female legislators* variable is measured by the percentage of female legislators in a state by year. The variable *female committee chair* was measured by females serving as committee chairs for those committees having jurisdiction over the policy issues of education, child support, welfare expenditures, and child health insurance programs. The *female institutional incorporation* variable was measured by the number of females holding formal leadership positions in the state house and senate including speaker of the house, assistant speaker of the house, president pro tem of the

¹⁴ See Appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables.

house, president of the senate, president pro tem of the senate and majority and minority leaders of the house and senate.

The variables *percent female committee chair* and *female institutional incorporation* are coded based on data from the *State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff* handbook which provided some challenges. There are similarities with the committee systems in each state and their overall function, but there is variation in the jurisdiction of committees per state. In order to code *female committee chair*, two of the dependent variables did not have a perfect “fit” for coding. For *per pupil education expenditures in constant dollars* and *percentage of children without health insurance*, the committees were education and health and committees with specific jurisdiction over these areas existed in each state. For *welfare benefits* and *percentage of child support collected*, it was determined that a social services committee in most states would have jurisdiction over these policy issues. For a number of states, a judgment call had to be made because there was more than one committee dealing with social services. For example, a state may have a human services committee and a child, youth and family committee. Obviously, either of those committee could have jurisdiction over these policy areas. Without having data from each state and verifying each year and the committee’s jurisdiction, there will not always be consistency. Therefore, to be consistent, coding of female committee chairs was done based on how the data were reported by the states. While the coding was consistent when the states had a number of committees listed with possible jurisdictions, it does provide challenges to the analysis. This will be addressed in the last chapter.

Similar challenges in coding occurred with *female institutional incorporation*. Most states have a similar leadership structure but the powers awarded to these leaders may vary by state. The handbook reports the leadership positions but without knowing the power structure designated in each state with these roles, there is no way of knowing what type of influence leaders would have. These challenges and results will be discussed in the last chapter.

For the remaining variables *unified Democratic government*, *percent Democratic legislators*, *citizen liberalism*, *political competition index*, *income*, *poverty*, and *female labor force participation*, various datasets previously listed were utilized to collect these data. *Unified Democratic government* is a dichotomous variable and is coded one if the Democratic Party controls both the legislative and executive branches in a state. It is used to interact with *female legislators*, *female committee chair*, and *female institutional incorporation* in order to test the models in this study. The variable *percent Democratic legislators* and *citizen liberalism* was used to control for the larger margins of Democratic party members and liberal ideological orientations because Democratic and liberal states are usually more generous with social welfare spending and social programs in general compared to the Republican party and conservative states. A *political competition index* variable is used with the range of one party control to legislative seats being evenly split between the parties to determine the range of influence based on unified or divided control of the state legislature. *Income*, *poverty*, and *female labor force participation* are used as controls because of the direct influence on finance and budgeting in the states.

MODELS

An OLS model with a lagged dependent variable and panel correlated standard errors is used to estimate the coefficients for this study. The model used to estimate the effects of female descriptive representation is presented below for state i and year t . The model will be run for all four dependent variables. Additionally, variables are interacted in order to estimate specific effects. Control variables include dummy variables for 46 states and nineteen years and the lagged dependent variables listed below.

Per Pupil Education Expenditures $_{it+1} = b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female education committee chair}_{it}) + b_4(\text{female education committee chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it}) + b_6(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_7(\text{female labor}_{it}) + b_8(\text{democrat legislature}_{it}) + b_9(\text{citizen liberalism}_{it}) + b_{10}(\text{political competition}_{it}) + b_{11}(\text{income}_{it}) + b_{12}(\text{poverty}_{it})$

Child Health Insurance $_{it+1} = b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female health committee chair}_{it}) + b_4(\text{female health committee chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it}) + b_6(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_7(\text{female labor}_{it}) + b_8(\text{democrat legislature}_{it}) + b_9(\text{citizen liberalism}_{it}) + b_{10}(\text{political competition}_{it}) + b_{11}(\text{income}_{it}) + b_{12}(\text{poverty}_{it})$

Welfare Benefits $_{it+1} = b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female social services [welfare] committee chair}_{it}) + b_4(\text{female social services [welfare] committee chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it}) + b_6(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_7(\text{female labor}_{it}) + b_8(\text{democrat legislature}_{it}) + b_9(\text{citizen liberalism}_{it}) + b_{10}(\text{political competition}_{it}) + b_{11}(\text{income}_{it}) + b_{12}(\text{poverty}_{it})$

incorporation_{it}) + b₆ (female institutional incorporation_{it}*unified democrat_{it}) + b₇(female labor_{it}) + b₈(democrat legislature_{it}) + b₉(citizen liberalism_{it}) + b₁₀(political competition_{it}) + b₁₁(income_{it}) + b₁₂(poverty_{it})

Child Support Collection_{it+1} = b₁(female legislators_{it}) + b₂(female legislators_{it}*unified democrat_{it}) + b₃ (female social services [child support] committee chair_{it}) + b₄ (female social services [child support] committee chair_{it}*unified democrat_{it}) + b₅(female institutional incorporation_{it}) + b₆ (female institutional incorporation_{it}*unified democrat_{it}) + b₇(female labor_{it}) + b₈(democrat legislature_{it}) + b₉(citizen liberalism_{it}) + b₁₀(political competition_{it}) + b₁₁(income_{it}) + b₁₂(poverty_{it})

The expectations from each model are as follows. According to the presence model (H1), the coefficient for *female legislators* will be positive supporting female descriptive representation leading to greater influence on female group salient issues. The simple incorporation model (H2) predicts female representation would only influence policy in a liberal governing coalition. Since this is a conditional hypothesis, interaction terms are included in the model (see Brambor, et al. 2006). When *unified Democratic government* is interacted with *female legislator*, the coefficient will be positive (while the coefficient for the baseline effect, b₁ is zero). This reveals the influence of *female legislators* is conditional upon the presence of a unified democratic control. The specific institutional incorporation model (H3) predicts a positive coefficient for *female committee chair*. With more female institutional power in the legislature, the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* will lead to greater influence on female group salient issues, according to the broad institutional

incorporation model (H4). When the variables *female legislators*, *female committee chair* and *female institutional incorporation* are interacted with *unified democrat government*, the party as a substantive model predicts a negative coefficient as representation and incorporation exert no additional influence under *unified Democratic government* (H5). This is also a conditional hypothesis, so the interaction terms are included.

Including the interaction terms in this model may increase multicollinearity making it less likely that the coefficient on the interaction term will be significant. Typically, the issue arises when the models are run with the interaction terms and the coefficients change, which is taken as a sign of multicollinearity. However, these coefficients are expected to change with the inclusion of the interaction terms and should not always be taken as a sign of multicollinearity. Even with high multicollinearity resulting in large standard errors, this does not mean that the results are wrong. With the interaction terms, the interest is in the effect of X on Y when condition Z is present. It is possible that even if the coefficients are insignificant in the model, the marginal effects may be significant, so the effects associated with multicollinearity are often “exaggerated” (Brambor et al 2006: 70). In the case of this study, preliminary models will be run including only relevant variables and those results will be compared to the full model. Also, predicted values will be calculated to determine the effect of X on Y when condition Z is present using the formula $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ$ ¹⁵.

¹⁵ In this study, X is female legislators, female committee chair (different for each dependent variable), and female institutional incorporation, and the condition Z is divided or unified Republican government (0) or unified Democratic government (1).

There are differences among the dependent variables selected for this work. Kaufman and Petrocik (1999) find social welfare spending and social issues, and the salience of these issues, are found to be one of the strongest predictors of behavior for females and males, with females favoring social welfare spending more than males. Therefore, female's presence in the legislature may have a stronger influence on the issues of *welfare benefits*, *percentage of children without health insurance*, and *percentage of child support collected*.

CONCLUSION

This study will contribute to the literature on female descriptive representation by a closer examination of legislative bodies and how female descriptive representation influences specific policy issues, or substantive representation. Rather than simply studying the increase in females in the legislature, this study turns to state level data and will examine the complexity of the lawmaking body and the mechanisms to determine influence, thus revealing the influence of female lawmakers is conditional. This influence may be with the presence of females in the legislature, females incorporated into the institutional system (i.e. serving as committee chairs, minority or majority party leaders or institutional leaders), or the conditioning effects of a majority governing coalition. Previous work does not account for all of these effects until Preuhs' 2006 work using race. This study will reveal the same conclusions about the effects of female descriptive representation on policy. In a larger context, this work will show the importance of a continued increase in females serving in lawmaking bodies and the longevity of their terms giving female legislators opportunities to serve in these

leadership roles thus increasing their policy influence. While the number of female legislators has flat lined, we have seen an increase in the number of women serving in committee chair positions as well as leadership positions like speaker of the house and Senate president and/or lieutenant governor. This work will also show these leadership positions are a necessary condition for increase policy influence, however, this is conditioned upon the political environment. Therefore, more females in public office are good, but the longer they are in these positions, the stronger their voice on female group salient issues.

CHAPTER IV

PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES IN THE STATES, 1983-2002

Female legislators always express concerns and commitments to representing women and their concerns. Research has shown females more strongly support government spending programs (Gilligan 1982a, 1982b; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), and they will support a more activist government in these areas. Further, female legislators tend to focus their legislative attention on issues such as education (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 2003). It is not the argument in this research that males don't care about education and education funding but females prioritize this issue as more important. We also learn females have said they will use their positions of power as party leaders or committee chairs to get their policy priorities on the party agenda or to achieve their policy goals. This chapter reviews the history of education funding in the United States, defines the model and hypotheses tested on the variable *per pupil educational expenditures*, and examines and discusses the results.

HISTORY OF EDUCATION FUNDING

The founding fathers understood the connection between a well-educated citizenry and a prosperous and developing country. However, they left responsibility of this initiative out of the Constitution. Historically, the national government, while

understanding its overall role in promoting the importance of education, has left the governance to state and local authorities. The support from the federal government has been a targeted approach. Additional funding has been provided for workforce education, support for math and science programs, and additional support through block grants for disadvantaged children. The role in the 1960s and 1970s changed as the state government began to rely on the federal government for these grants of money providing the federal government more influence in decision making. However, in the 1980s, the federal government's role began to decline again, reinforcing the state's primary role in providing education to its citizens. The federal government still maintained a role in providing for handicapped and disadvantaged children but the other responsibility rested with the states (Elmore and Fuhrman 1990).

Education funding is always a topic of debate in local school boards, state legislatures, and in Congress. Historically, the public education systems in the states have been financed mainly through a property tax based system resulting in wealthier districts providing more in per pupil educational expenditures than poorer school districts. This resulted in increased litigation in the states challenging this property-based education finance system. Court rulings in numerous states have concluded that this system is unconstitutional and ordered the state to develop different ways to provide equitable financing. Many states face the challenge of moving from local government control of education to state control in order to address the inequalities.

In 1971, the *Serrano* case in California became famous dealing with education funding and policy regarding inequalities. The California public education system was

under attack for its financing structure dependent largely on a school district's tax base resulting in inequalities in per pupil educational expenditures. For example, in 1968-1969, the Baldwin Park School District spent \$577.49 in per pupil educational expenditures while the Beverly Hills spent \$1239.72. The court ruling struck down this system and said the system California had in place to offset the inequalities was inadequate. According to the Supreme Court, "affluent districts have their cake and eat it too; they can provide a high quality education for their children while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by contrast, have no cake at all" (National Center for Education Statistics, NCES hereafter, www.nces.ed.gov).

Starting with this case in California, court rulings in almost every state have questioned the constitutionality of an education funding system that is so reliant on local property wealth. In about 1/3 of the states, the supreme courts have ruled this system unconstitutional based on their interpretation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution as well as education articles in state constitutions. In more recent cases, rulings cited the unique needs of the students in poorer districts and the lack of resources in these areas. States were forced to reevaluate their financing system and enact changes to address the inequalities resulting in states redirecting funding to poorer districts (Card and Payne 2002; Dee 2004; Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998). In many cases, the court ruling set deadlines for changes to the system. Reviewing district level data from 1972-1992 concluded that the earliest state reforms of education financing resulted in an increase in spending by 11 percent in the poorest state districts while the funding in wealthy districts remained the same (Murray, Evans, and Schwab 1998). However, in

later cases, rulings indicated that states had not done an adequate job addressing the problem so the reforms continued.

In early 1990, governors in the fifty states convened to endorse a set of national goals for education and then President George Bush endorsed these goals in his State of the Union address . This was an historic time in the debate over the national government's role in education with the support from the governors. When Clinton came into office, his strategy was systematic reforms. "The goals are to set high expectations for all American schools; to include students at risk, now typically served by isolated programs that focus on remediation, in more ambitious instruction aimed at the standards; and to coordinate all federal programs to serve common purposes" (Furhman 1994: 84). The Clinton Administration had a number of initiatives with goals and expectations for improving education and providing grants of money to states for these reforms. In order to receive much needed funding, the states had to comply (Furhman 1994).

The most recent 2002 No Child Left Behind Act also linked performance in public schools to federal government funding for education. If students did not perform, schools would not qualify for government grants and the government could take control of the school and shut it down. This legislation, along with the educational reform in the 1990s has led to a larger role in education by the federal government, a change from the 1980s.

According to the NCES 2011 report, per pupil expenditures rose during the 1980s, remained stable during the first part of the 1990s, and rose again after 1992–93.

From 1980–1991, there was an increase of 37 percent. From 1990–91 to 1994–95, the change was less than 1 percent, with an increase of 32 percent from 1994–95 to 2007–08. In 2007–08, per pupil educational expenditures in the states were approximately \$10,297 (NCES). As a result of the state level litigation and reform, increasing pressure from the national level, and increases in spending, selecting this variable for this research study is timely to determine female legislators' influence.


Figure 6 represents the mean per pupil educational expenditures during the years of this study, 1983-2002. The Figure reveals a steady increase in the amount of expenditures in education for almost all years. This increase parallels the increase in the number of female legislators, increase in female committee chairs, and increase in the number of leadership positions held by females in the state legislatures. Given these trends, we would expect there is some influence of female descriptive representation and increases in spending on education.

MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to estimate the coefficients for *per pupil education expenditures*:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Per Pupil Education Expenditures}_{it+1} = & b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female} \\ & \text{legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female education committee chair}_{it}) + b_4 \\ & (\text{female education committee chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female institutional} \\ & \text{incorporation}_{it}) + b_6(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it} * \text{unified} \\ & \text{democrat}_{it}) + b_7(\text{female labor}_{it}) + b_8(\text{democrat legislature}_{it}) + b_9(\text{citizen} \\ & \text{liberalism}_{it}) + b_{10}(\text{political competition}_{it}) + b_{11}(\text{income}_{it}) + b_{12}(\text{poverty}_{it}) \end{aligned}$$

FIGURE 6 EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES IN THE STATES, 1983-2002



Note: Graph represents mean per pupil educational expenditures in dollars by year. N=1000 (50 states, 20 years). Source: State Politics and policy Quarterly State data set.

Also explained in Chapter III were the hypotheses for this study. Hypothesis 1 (H1) states *female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. Since females prioritize issues such as education, an increase in the number of females in legislative bodies will result in more attention to this issue, thus, an increase in per pupil education expenditures in the states. According to hypothesis 2 (H2), *when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. When *unified Democratic government* is interacted with *female legislator*, the coefficient will be positive, revealing influence of *female*

legislators on an increase in per pupil educational expenditures is conditional upon the presence of a unified democratic control of the state government. In the case of this model and hypothesis, predicted values will be calculated to determine the influence of female legislators in a liberal governing coalition.

Hypothesis 3 (H3) states *when female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. In the case of education spending, if a female is chair of the education committee in the state, the result will be an increase in per pupil educational expenditures. Table 1 shows the increases in the number of females who serve as education committee chairs. The number of female education committee chairs increased during the late 1980s and held relatively stable until the mid-1990s. During the late 1990s, the number of females who served as chair increased significantly, about 63 percent from 1997 to 2002.

According to hypothesis 4 (H4), *female control of formal leadership positions is positively associated with policies favoring women's interests*. With more female institutional power in the legislature (an increase in the number of leadership positions held by females), the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* will be positive, revealing the influence on increases in per pupil educational expenditures.

TABLE 1 FEMALE EDUCATION COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1983-2002

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>
1983	18	1993	22
1984	18	1994	22
1985	11	1995	22
1986	11	1996	19
1987	11	1997	19
1988	11	1998	22
1989	21	1999	24
1990	21	2000	28
1991	19	2001	26
1992	19	2002	31

Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female education committee chair in either the House or Senate by year. N=1000 (50 states, 20 years). Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff*.

Finally, hypothesis 5 (H5) states *when parties share the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female representation or institutional power and policies benefiting females*. In order to test this hypothesis, interaction terms were created. When the variables of *female legislators*, *female committee chair* and *female institutional incorporation* are interacted with *unified democrat government*, the party as a substantive model predicts an increase in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing coalition. The coefficient for these interactions is expected to be negative because the political party shares these same policy preferences thus negating the influence of female legislators. In order to understand the results of the interaction terms and the conditional effects of a liberal governing coalition, predicted values will be calculated to explain the

influence of female legislators, committee chairs, and female leadership on educational expenditures.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of the preliminary models run on the data.

Interaction terms are included in the model in order to test the conditional effects of political party. As explained in Chapter III, the introduction of the interaction terms does introduce some collinearity but allows for the proper specification of the theoretical expectations. Further, the predicted value of the independent variable on the dependent variable with the conditional effects of the model helps explain the interaction terms.

We expect to find when females are in a state which is dominated by a liberal governing coalition and in which the Democratic party holds the most seats, female legislators will not have the influence over policymaking compared to cases where there is no liberal governing coalition. Each theoretical model was run with only variables related to that model and the results are presented in the Table. The *Simple Incorporation Model* is represented by the interaction between *female legislators* and *unified democratic government* (from the model, $\text{female legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}$). The results from the model labeled “party” are the results presented in the Table below which is the full model to show how the influence of female legislators is reduced in Democratic controlled governments.

**TABLE 2 PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF
FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON
PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES, 1983-2002**

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Presence</i>	<i>Specific</i>	<i>Broad</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Party</i>
Female Legislators (%)	-19.18* (5.18)			-20.20* (6.09)	-21.19* (7.83)
Fem Leg*UniDemGov					2.20 (11.19)
Female Education Chair		-114.02 (76.05)		-92.08 (70.02)	-177.18* (90.27)
Fem Ed Chair*UniDemGov					357.92* (166.23)
Female Inst Incorporation			-6.15 (4.29)	2.43 (4.43)	4.30 (5.43)
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov					-10.04 (8.55)
Unified Dem Gov	-235.24* (82.81)	-236.26* (85.85)	-232.82* (84.96)	-237.09* (83.58)	-261.46 (153.78)
Democratic Legislators (%)	1.65 (2.64)	3.70 (2.70)	2.82 (2.81)	1.89 (2.69)	2.04 (2.67)
Citizen Liberalism	15.81* (3.08)	13.93* (3.19)	14.43* (3.15)	15.72* (3.07)	16.39* (3.42)
Political Competition	31.77* (2.42)	31.39* (2.48)	30.96* (2.46)	32.05* (2.49)	31.60* (2.62)
Income	.18* (.01)	.18* (.01)	.18* (.01)	.18* (.02)	.18* (.02)
Poverty	-79.72* (11.73)	-79.05* (11.77)	-78.91* (11.78)	-80.25* (11.86)	-79.39* (12.07)
Fem Labor Force Part	.21 (11.34)	-6.18 (12.28)	-5.75 (11.86)	1.18 (11.28)	3.98 (11.28)
Per Pupil Edu Expend	.10* (.03)	.10* (.03)	.10* (.03)	.10* (.03)	.10* (.03)
Constant	1145.54 (769.00)	1335.77 (819.26)	1358.99 (809.76)	1096.44 (774.13)	941.24 (773.92)
Wald χ^2	4021.05*	3883.34*	3786.90*	4134.66*	3965.69*
R ²	.66	.66	.66	.66	.66

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Per Pupil Education Expenditures (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=940 for all models (47 states, 20 years). AK, HI, and NE are excluded.

Table 3 reports the results of the full model. While the coefficients are significant for coefficients representing the *Presence Model* (H1) and *Specific Institutional Incorporation Model* (H3) based on a one tailed t-test with significance level of .05, they are in the wrong direction. According to the hypotheses, an increase in the number of female state legislators and a female serving as education committee chair should result in an increase in per pupil educational expenditures. In the case of these results, female representation and incorporation would lead to a decrease in education funding. The *Broad Institutional Incorporation Model* (H4) is not supported by these results as the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* is not significant. An increase in the number of females in leadership positions, like speaker of the house or majority leader, had no additional influence on per pupil educational expenditures. With these results, examination could be done in future research to determine if the Democratic Party in states with high levels of citizen liberalism and/or in highly competitive states would actively seek to nominate women, especially liberal women, to public office.

In order to understand the interaction terms and their significance, predicted values must be calculated. The results are presented in Table 4. The *Simple Incorporation Model* (H2) is not supported by these results. When *female legislators* is interacted with *unified democratic government*, we expect the predicted value to be positive meaning the influence of female legislators is conditioned by the presence of a liberal governing coalition (unified Democratic control of the state government). The values are negative, not significant, and it appears the party is diminishing the effect of

female legislators. Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of the effects of female legislators on per pupil educational expenditures by party control of the government. The graph reveals that as the percentage of females increase in the state legislature, the effect is a decrease in expenditures but those results are only significant when the government is divided or controlled by the Republican Party. The *Party as a Substantive Representative Model* (H5) is also not supported by these results. While the predicted value is negative, it is not significant for *unified Democratic government*. Increasing female representation and incorporation in a liberal governing coalition (a state government controlled by the Democratic Party) will exert no additional influence on policy issues. Figures 7, 8, and 9 provide graphical illustrations for *female legislators*, *female education committee chair*, and *female institutional incorporation* and the effect on per pupil educational expenditures by party control. The graphs reveal the negative effect of female descriptive representation and incorporation on education spending in a liberal governing coalition compared to divided control or Republican control. An interesting finding from the results is the effects of divided control of government or unified control by the Republican Party. The predicted value is significant and negative. While the hypothesis predicts negative values, in this case, the significant results are with divided government or a non-liberal governing coalition. In the case of per pupil educational spending, the predicted value is both negative and significant for *female legislators* and *female education committee chair* in a divided or unified Republican government. These results are not as expected according to the model and have implications for future research, especially the influence of the Republican Party.

TABLE 3 THE EFFECT OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES, 1983-2002

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
Female Legislators (%)	-21.19* (7.83)
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government	2.20 (11.19)
Female Education Committee Chair	-177.18* (90.27)
Female Education Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government	357.92* (166.23)
Female Institutional Incorporation	4.30 (5.43)
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government	-10.04 (8.55)
Unified Democratic Government	-261.46 (153.78)
Democratic Legislators (%)	2.04 (2.67)
Citizen Liberalism	16.39* (3.42)
Political Competition	31.60* (2.62)
Income	.18* (.02)
Poverty	-79.39* (12.07)
Female Labor Force Participation	3.98 (11.28)
Per Pupil Education Expenditures	.10* (.03)
Constant	941.24 (773.92)
Wald χ^2	3965.69*
R ²	.66

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Per Pupil Education Expenditures (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=940 for all models (47 states, 20 years). AK, HI, and NE are excluded.

TABLE 4 PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE EDUCATION COMMITTEE CHAIR, AND FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT, 1983-2002


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Predicted Value</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>T-Statistic</i>
Female Legislators (%)			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	-21.19*	7.91	-2.68
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-280.45	205.28	-1.37
Female Education Committee Chair			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	-177.18*	87.92	-2.02
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-80.72	265.44	-0.30
Female Institutional Incorporation			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	4.30	5.69	0.76
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-267.2	212.25	-1.26

Note: Cells Represent constant dollar amounts. Predicted values for female legislator, female committee chair, and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ$. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z is present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=0 when unified Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).

The other significant variables in the model include: *citizen liberalism*, *political competition*, *income*, and *poverty*. The significance of *citizen liberalism* indicates that the higher the state's rating of liberalism, the more money will be spent on education funding. Income and poverty coefficients are both significant and as indicated, as income increases, education spending increases while an increase in poverty results in a decrease in spending on education. Historical analysis of education spending reveals the reliance on local property taxes to fund a significant portion of per pupil education expenses so the significance of these variables makes sense. Finally, according to V.O. Key's model, party competition leads to the passage of policies more generous than would be pursued without party competition (1949). Therefore, when *political*

competition is significant, the more “competitive” the state, meaning the closer the number of seats between the Democratic and Republican parties, the more positive the influence on education funding.

FIGURE 7 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS ON PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of percentage increases in females in the state legislature by party control of government.

DISCUSSION

While the results for models with the variable *per pupil educational expenditures* did not provide any significant results, it does provide for an interesting discussion.


While women typically advocate for female group salient issues and women prioritize issues concerning education, based on these results, female descriptive representation and incorporation does not lead to any additional influence on per pupil educational

expenditures. In the case of conditional effects, the Democratic Party does not provide more influence in the area of education spending than female descriptive representation. At the same time, the Republican Party appears to have some effect on educational expenditures. None of the models predicted these results but it opens the door for future research in this area. As revealed in Figure 5 (Chapter III), there has been a steady increase in Republican female legislators. This increase may be having an influence on female group salient issues that the five models tested in this study did not consider. Future studies may want to consider additional control variables or test a different model to determine what influence the Republican Party has in the state legislature. It may also be interesting to study regional influences of the Republican Party to determine if the Party in states varies in characteristics and policy goals resulting in different levels of influence by female legislators.

As history reveals, education spending and initiatives gained much attention over the past several decades at the local, state, and national level. In most states, education is one of the largest state expenditures. Therefore, whether or not there are more females in the legislature or females in leadership positions, education is not ignored. There is always pressure from the local school districts for additional funding to help educate their students. This pressure is heightened by state legislatures and national education initiatives to provide equitable educational opportunities, decrease dropout rates, increase graduation rates, and increase test scores. Further, the pressure from court rulings in the past few decades has added to the states' responsibility to address the inequalities in funding and constitutionality in their educational systems. The


individuals in the government positions may not be as influential in exerting influence over funding as are external factors forced on states.

FIGURE 8 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE EDUCATION COMMITTEE CHAIR ON PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of moving from a male education committee chair to a female education committee chair by party control of government.

FIGURE 9 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON PER PUPIL EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of increases in female institutional incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government.

For example, the state of Texas has been focused on inequalities in education spending for decades. During the time of this study, the Texas Supreme Court agreed and ruled in the 1989 *Edgewood v Kirby* case the financing system of public education in Texas to be unconstitutional. This came after about twenty years of the legislature trying a number of different measures to ensure equality in education expenditures while also protecting the rights of local ISDs. Funding is still an issue in the state of Texas: the wealthy districts want to keep their tax dollars to provide for their students and the poorer districts believe funding equality is not adequate because the needs of their students in these poorer districts are usually greater (Tannahill 2005). Most states have

struggled with the same issues as Texas in the past fifty years. On the national scene, the government is increasing pressure for systematic reforms of education through the reform efforts during the Clinton administration. When money is at stake, governing bodies take action. The pressure game is on and whether males or females in the state legislatures, serving as education committee chair, or in leadership positions, education and per pupil expenditures is always a topic of discussion and debate and would not be ignored as a result of fewer females.

Another interesting way to evaluate the influence of females in governing bodies on issues of education may be to examine the role of the state education governing boards that are carrying out the initiatives. Females may be advocating for more for local school districts to have control. Examining how the states use educational funds, possibly in support of female issues in education, may also provide interesting results. Also, one could look at bill sponsorship by female lawmakers to determine if they are pushing issues dealing with education funding. While this study looked at the chair of the education committee to determine female influence, it may be that the finance chair or appropriations chair in a state has more influence over education funding than the education committee chair. Examining local school boards and the influence of females may also provide a more interesting approach to studying female descriptive representation influence.

The last chapter provides a discussion of these issues, the overall findings, and future research in this area.

CHAPTER V

CHILD HEALTH – THE UNINSURED IN THE STATES, 1987-2002

Health care and the welfare of family and children is always a top priority for females (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 2003) and typically, women are more supportive of government programs, action, and intervention (Schlesinger and Heldman 2000). Due to females' traditional role as the primary caregiver, female legislators are also more sensitive about the consequences social policies have for individuals (Carroll 1988; Gidengil 1995), women believing the government, among other thing, had a responsibility to "provide...health care" (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986, Gilens 1988, Chaney, Alvarez and Nagler 1998). This chapter reviews the history of child health insurance coverage in the United States, defines the model and hypotheses tested on the variable *percentage of children without health insurance*, and examines and discusses the results.

HISTORY OF CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE

Since the depression era, America has enacted numerous programs aimed at helping the families with dependent children, the poor and underprivileged. As part of these programs, states were allowed to provide additional funding to welfare recipients for them to provide medical care for their children. Much of the focus of these early programs, as part of the Social Security Acts, was to provide immunizations,

preventative measure to deal with infant mortality, and services to children with special needs (Mann 2003).

With the enactment of Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965, health care coverage became an entitlement for low income families. While many Americans are able to get access to health care through their employer based system, there are low income children who do not have this access and public coverage becomes crucial. Medicaid was structured as a joint federal-state program to share the costs of providing health care to low income Americans. The administration, guidelines for eligibility, and scope of coverage was left to the states. However, states choose to participate in the program because they get federal funding to help cover some of the costs even though they must meet and comply with federal guidelines. States also have the option to expand coverage beyond the minimum guidelines set by the federal government (Mann 2003).

Amendments to the Medicaid programs in the 1980s eliminated cost sharing for families and health services were provided at no cost to the families. However, this period saw a decline in the number of children enrolled in the Medicaid program. When it was first enacted, the health coverage was only provided to families who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments from the government. When the eligibility for AFDC declined in the 1970s and 1980s and subsequently, enrollment of children in the Medicaid program declined, Congress took action. Eligibility was no longer based on AFDC status but on income level and it was opened to two-parent families. In 1989, states were required to cover children under the age of six, and in the

early 1990s, the coverage expanded to required coverage until the age of eighteen. States could also expand coverage to those with higher incomes who were eligible for Medicaid and would receive federal funds to help cover these costs. In the early 1990s, only one state, Washington, covered children at all ages based on Medicaid eligibility (Mann 2003).

In 1993, the Clinton Administration failed in their attempt to pass comprehensive health care legislation. As a result, they were looking for smaller initiatives providing the needed coverage that could gain support in Congress, especially when dealing with children's health insurance. While health care coverage was primarily through Medicaid, there were a large number of uninsured children in each state who did not qualify because of income level. Many families fell through the cracks because they were ineligible for coverage and they were unable to purchase a private health insurance plan because it was too expensive. Prior to the 1997 legislation, it was up to the state to develop any additional programs to help cover uninsured individuals and children.

In 1997, President Clinton signed into law the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to insure children in families with too much income to qualify for Medicaid and too little to afford private insurance. States have the option of creating their SCHIP programs as an independent program separate from Medicaid, use SCHIP funds to expand their Medicaid program, or a combination of the two programs. States typically receive block grants of money to fund the program they choose and to encourage states to participate, the federal government pays a higher share of the spending on SCHIP than they do on Medicaid. On average, the federal government pays

70 percent and state governments pay 30 percent of program costs. Unlike Medicaid, these enhanced federal matching payments are limited by national and state-specific annual limits (“Children’s Health Insurance Program” 2011).

The states have flexibility in designing their eligibility requirements for SCHIP. States may cover children in families making 200 percent over the poverty level (set by the national government) or 50 percent above their Medicaid threshold. When reviewing the requirements, there is a lot of variation among the states. For example, in 2008, “23 states allow a maximum income equal to 200 percent of the poverty level, 20 states set the limit above 200 percent of the poverty level, and 7 states set it below 200 percent of the poverty level” (Orszag 2008, 2). North Dakota reported the lowest with 140 percent of the poverty level and New Jersey was the highest at 350 percent of the poverty level (Orszag 2008).

Given this historical information about children’s health insurance coverage, states were given a lot of flexibility with insuring children. Prior to the SCHIP program, the states were ultimately responsible for the health care coverage of children and with the passage of the federal program, states are still given flexibility in how many are covered. Therefore, using children’s health insurance coverage as a variable is timely in order to determine whether female descriptive representation had any influence on the state action resulting in fewer uninsured children. In other words, were states taking more action because of the presence of female legislators and female leadership?

Figure 10 represents the mean percentage of uninsured children in the states from 1987-2002. The US Census Bureau did not start recording coverage rates among


children until 1987 so that is the start date for data collection for this study. The percentage of uninsured children was steady at about 12 percent for much of the 1980s and then slightly increased in the 1990s. In the mid-nineties, the rate of uninsured children dropped significantly to an all-time low of less than 10 percent. The question for this chapter is whether the increase in female descriptive representation and incorporation has had any influence on the health insurance coverage rates of children in the states. Women more interested and concerned about this issue, and an increase in the number of females in the legislature brings attention to issues ignored in the past.

MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to estimate the coefficients for *percentage of children without health insurance*:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Child Health Insurance}_{it+1} = & b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female} \\ & \text{legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female health committee chair}_{it}) + b_4(\text{female} \\ & \text{health committee chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female institutional} \\ & \text{incorporation}_{it}) + b_6(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it} * \text{unified} \\ & \text{democrat}_{it}) + b_7(\text{female labor}_{it}) + b_8(\text{democrat legislature}_{it}) + b_9(\text{citizen} \\ & \text{liberalism}_{it}) + b_{10}(\text{political competition}_{it}) + b_{11}(\text{income}_{it}) + b_{12}(\text{poverty}_{it}). \end{aligned}$$

FIGURE 10 CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE STATES, 1987-2002



Note: Values represent mean percentages of children without health insurance by year. N=800 (50 states, 16 years). Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

The hypotheses for this study described were explained in Chapter III.

According to hypothesis 1 (H1), *female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. Since health care is always a top priority for females, an increase in the number of females in legislative bodies will result in a decrease in the percentage of uninsured children in the states. Hypothesis 2 (H2) states *when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. When *unified Democratic government* is interacted with *female legislator*, the coefficient will be positive, revealing the influence of *female*

legislators on the rate of children without health insurance and it is conditional upon the presence of a unified democratic control of the state government. Predicted values will be calculated to determine the influence of female legislators in a liberal governing coalition. According to hypothesis 3 (H3), *when female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. In the case of child health insurance coverage, if a female is chair of the health committee in the state, the result will be a decrease in the percentage of children without health insurance in the state. In H1, H2, and H3, the coefficients are expected to be negative because the dependent variable is decreasing.

Table 5 shows the increases in the number of females who serve as health committee chairs. The number of female health committee chairs has increased significantly since the early 1990s. From 1990 to 2002, the rate of female health committee chairs increased by about 58 percent. With this increase in number, this research predicts female influence on the committee that is responsible for health care programs in the state will have an effect on overall children's health insurance coverage.

According to hypothesis 4 (H4), *female control of formal leadership positions is positively associated with policies favoring women's interests*. With more female institutional power in the legislature, the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* will be negative revealing the influence on a decrease of uninsured children in the state. Finally, hypothesis 5 (H5) states *when parties share the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of*

female representation or institutional power and policies benefiting females. When the variables of *female legislators*, *female committee chair*, and *female institutional incorporation* are interacted with *unified democrat government*, the model predicts an increase in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing coalition. The coefficient for these interactions is expected to be positive in the case of this dependent variable because the political party shares these same policy preferences thus negating the influence of female legislators. Predicted values are calculated in order to understand the results and significance of the interaction terms, and to explain the influence of female legislators, committee chairs, and female leadership on child health insurance coverage.

TABLE 5 FEMALE HEALTH COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1987-2002

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>
1987	16	1995	26
1988	16	1996	26
1989	19	1997	32
1990	19	1998	31
1991	21	1999	33
1992	22	2000	32
1993	27	2001	29
1994	27	2002	30

Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female health committee chair in either the House or Senate by year. N=800 (50 states, 16 years). Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff*.

**TABLE 6 PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF
FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON CHILD
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 1987-2002**

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Presence</i>	<i>Specific</i>	<i>Broad</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Party</i>
Female Legislators (%)	.07* (.02)			.07* (.02)	.05* (.03)
Fem Leg*UniDemGov					.08 (.05)
Female Health Chair		.80* (.32)		.61* (.30)	.93* (.34)
Fem HlthChair*UniDemGov					-1.89 (.83)
Female Inst Incorporation			.02 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov					.04 (.05)
Unified Dem Gov	-.20 (.46)	-.19 (.45)	-.25 (.45)	-.17 (.46)	-1.34 (.99)
Democratic Legislators (%)	-.01 (.02)	-.12 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
Citizen Liberalism	-.11* (.01)	.10* (.01)	-.10* (.01)	-.11* (.01)	-.11* (.02)
Political Competition	-.07* (.02)	-.07* (.02)	-.07* (.02)	-.07* (.02)	-.07* (.02)
Income	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00* (.00)
Poverty	.63 (.06)	.63* (.06)	.63* (.06)	.63* (.06)	.63* (.06)
Fem Labor Force Part	-.10 (.04)	-.08* (.04)	-.07 (.04)	-.10* (.04)	.12* (.04)
Child Health Uninsured (%)	.04 (.03)	.06* (.02)	.05 (.02)	.05* (.02)	.05* (.02)
Constant	15.15* (3.05)	14.65* (3.12)	13.93* (3.13)	15.67* (3.08)	16.77* (2.99)
Wald χ^2	1215.74*	1292.16*	1245.67*	1410.09*	1951.62*
R ²	.48	.48	.47	.48	.49

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Uninsured Children (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=742 for all models (47 states, 16 years). AK, HI, and NE are excluded.

RESULTS

The results presented in Table 6 are the preliminary models run on the data and with only variables related to that model and the results are presented in the Table. As explained in Chapter III, these results are provided to address the issue of collinearity and the importance of the interaction terms in the models in order to explain the conditional effects of each variable. The interaction between *female legislators* and *unified democratic government* (from the model, $\text{female legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}$) represents the *Simple Incorporation Model*. The results from the model labeled “party” is the full model to show how the influence of female legislators is reduced in Democratic controlled governments.

Table 7 presents the results of the full model. *The Presence Model* (H1) and the *Specific Institutional Incorporation Model* (H3) both reveal significant coefficients but in both cases, they are in the wrong direction. Since with the variable *percentage of children without health insurance* the expectation is a decreased in the percentage of uninsured, the coefficient for *female legislators* and *female health committee chair* should be negative. *The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model* (H4) was also not supported, with no significant results from the model. The coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* was not significant thus there was no support for an increase in females in leadership positions regarding the percentage of uninsured in the state.

TABLE 7 THE EFFECT OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 1987-2002

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
Female Legislators (%)	.05* (.03)
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government	.08 (.05)
Female Health Committee Chair	.93* (.34)
Female Education Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government	-1.89 (.83)
Female Institutional Incorporation	-.02 (.02)
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government	.04 (.05)
Unified Democratic Government	-1.34 (.99)
Democratic Legislators (%)	-.01 (.02)
Citizen Liberalism	-.11* (.02)
Political Competition	-.07* (.02)
Income	.00* (.00)
Poverty	.63* (.06)
Female Labor Force Participation	.12* (.04)
Child Health Uninsured (%)	.05* (.02)
Constant	16.77* (2.99)
Wald χ^2	1951.62*
R ²	.49

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Uninsured Children (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=742 for all models (47 states, 16 years). AK, HI, and NE are excluded.

TABLE 8 PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE HEALTH COMMITTEE CHAIR, FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT, 1987-2002

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Predicted Value</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>T-Statistic</i>
Female Legislators (%)			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	.05	.03	1.77
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-1.20	.87	-1.39
Female Health Committee Chair			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	.93*	.35	2.65
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-2.29	1.26	-1.83
Female Institutional Incorporation			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	-.02	.02	-.76
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-1.31	.89	-1.47

Note: Cells Represent percentages. Predicted Value for female legislators, female committee chair, and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula:


$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ$. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z is present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=0 when unified Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).

In order to understand the significance of the interaction terms and if female representation and incorporation is conditional upon the presence of a liberal governing coalition, predicted values are calculated. Table 8 presents these values for *female legislators, female health committee chair, and female institutional incorporation* on the percentage of uninsured children by party control of government.

The Simple Institutional Incorporation Model (H2) is not supported by the results. The predicted value for female legislators should be negative since the dependent variable, child health insurance coverage is measured by percentage of uninsured, but it is not significant. Female representation does not have any additional effect on reducing the number of uninsured children in a state with a liberal governing coalition (unified Democratic government). Figure 11 provides a graphical illustration of the effect of

female legislators on percentage of uninsured children by party control of government and it reveals that the percentage actually increases but the results are also not significant.

FIGURE 11 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT




Note: Values represent percentages as a result of percentage increases in females in the state legislature by party control of government.

The *Party as a Substantive Representative Model* (H5) is also not supported by these. The effect for *female legislators*, *female health committee chair*, and *female institutional incorporation* should be positive and significant and this is not the case in any of the three. Figures 11, 12, and 13 provide graphical illustrations of these effects in a divided or unified Republican government and a unified Democratic government. The


only significant results of found with *female health committee chair* in a divided government or a government controlled by the Republican Party which results in a .93 percent increase in the number of uninsured children in a state as a result of a change from a male health committee chair to a female chair. While the model only predicts the effects of a liberal governing coalition, these results are interesting and may provide implications for future research.

FIGURE 12 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE HEALTH COMMITTEE CHAIR ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent percentages as a result of moving from a male health committee chair (0) to a female health committee chair (1) by party control of government.

FIGURE 13 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON CHILD HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent percentages as a result of increases in female institutional incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government.

There are also a number of control variables with significant coefficients: *citizen liberalism*, *political competition*, *income*, *poverty*, and *female labor force participation*. However, only in the cases of *citizen liberalism* and *political competition index* was the coefficient negative meaning an increase would result in a decrease of uninsured children. When more individuals in the state are liberal and when there is more political competition in the state legislature between the parties, the result is a decrease in the number of uninsured children. As mentioned previously, future research could examine the Democratic Party in states with high levels of citizen liberalism and competition to

determine if they actively seek to nominate women, especially liberal women, to attract votes in a highly competitive electoral environment.

DISCUSSION

The results do not provide any support for the five models tested using the variable *percentage of children without health insurance*. Results revealed that an increase in female representation and incorporation exerts no additional influence on reducing the number of uninsured children in a state with a liberal governing coalition. The results of a *female health committee chair* in a divided or unified Republican government on health insurance coverage did provide significant results. Future research may want to address a non-liberal governing coalition and what may be happening with female legislators and their influence on policy in this type of political environment.

While these results are disappointing when trying to argue the importance of female state legislators and leadership on the health coverage of children, there are a number of reasons that this particular variable may have these results. Looking at the decrease in the number of children without health insurance, one could argue that it was the result of the SCHIP program passed in 1997 rather than the influence of females in the legislature. States were not only provided an initiative from the national level to provide for children's health care needs but the states were provided the funding for these services. Much of the restraint on the states with providing social services is funding and since the national government made this a priority and provided grant money, the states had the resources. An interesting way to study this issue may be to

look at what was happening in Congress during this time period. While the number of females in Congress is a smaller percentage than in the state legislature, a study could be done of female descriptive representation in Congress as well as the female committee chairs and leadership roles to determine the influence on this legislation and the subsequent decrease in the number of uninsured children.

Also, coverage of children through a government program is an output of government. Therefore, examining the number of female legislators, female committee chairs, and female leadership may not be the best approach to studying this variable. One important area that this particular study ignores is females and the legislation they sponsor. While the number and leadership of females was not driving the change in health insurance coverage, results of studying legislation sponsorship may reveal that female legislators did push this issue. Since the results reveal that in a liberal governing coalition, females exerted no additional influence, the Democratic Party was taking up this issue as important. Covering children with health insurance was important and was being done in the states but it was not the presence or institutional incorporation of females who exerted the most influence.

The last chapter provides a discussion of the overall findings and implications, and future research in this area.

CHAPTER VI

WELFARE BENEFITS IN THE STATES

1983-2002

As mentioned in previous chapters, females more strongly support government spending programs because of their more compassionate stance on issues and their support of a more activist government. The welfare of family and children is always a priority of females and since females are found to identify with other females on issues, or a group perspective on issues (Mansbridge 1995), funding for welfare benefits can be influenced by females in the legislature. When the number of female state legislators increases, there are more females to focus their attention on issues ignored in the past. Since females prioritize this issue, we expect to find some changes in maximum monthly welfare benefits. This chapter reviews the history of welfare benefits in the United States, defines the model and hypotheses tested on the variable *welfare benefits*, and examines and discusses the results.

HISTORY OF WELFARE BENEFITS

The Great Society programs of the 1960s expanded welfare in the United States. At this time, individuals who were not elderly or disabled were able to receive government assistance through the welfare program. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) provided states with federal matching funds to provide cash assistance to needy families and children. The federal government provided the money and the


states distributed it. A family was eligible for AFDC if they fell below the need standard based on their income and the level a state determined a family needed to live.

In 1996, the Clinton Administration and Congress passed legislation changing the focus of the AFDC program. The welfare program was reformed to a program providing short term assistance to families in need and began encouraging people back into the work force. The national government was giving money to the state based on the number of people who were on welfare and gave the state no directive in how to distribute funds. The change from the welfare reform act resulted in the power being given back to the states. As a condition of getting this money under this new program, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), states did have to meet requirements set by the federal government. For example, the states had to set up programs to encourage people into the workforce and set a five year limit on the time one can receive TANF benefits. Because TANF gave individual states increased flexibility with these new policies, the reforms implemented varied by state. Schram found a relationship between the racial makeup in the state and tougher welfare policies. For example, if there were more blacks in the welfare system in a state, the result would be tougher welfare policies (2005). The states were given a lot of control, and how they distributed the funds is interesting because of the potential influence of the players in the governing bodies.

Figure 14 represents the maximum monthly welfare benefits from 1983-2002. As one can see, the benefit levels decreased over the years. Given the varying degrees of funding and flexibility in the states, the variable is still appropriate to study because

there could be an effect on benefit levels as a result of female descriptive representation and incorporation.

FIGURE 14 WELFARE BENEFITS IN THE STATES, 1983-2002



Note: Values represent maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three. N=960 (48 states, 20 years. AK and HI excluded because no data reported) Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to estimate the coefficients for maximum monthly *welfare benefits* for a family of three:

$$\text{Welfare Benefits}_{it+1} = b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female social services [welfare] committee chair}_{it}) + b_4(\text{female social services [welfare] committee chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female}$$

institutional incorporation_{it})+ b₆ (female institutional incorporation_{it}*unified
 democrat_{it})+b₇(female labor_{it})+ b₈(democrat legislature_{it})+b₉(citizen
 liberalism_{it})+b₁₀(political competition_{it})+ b₁₁(income_{it})+b₁₂(poverty_{it})

The hypotheses for this study were described in Chapter III. According to hypothesis 1 (H1), *female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. The health and welfare of children and families is a priority among female legislators, thus, an increase in female descriptive representation results in an increase in maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three in the states. Hypothesis 2 (H2) states *when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. When *unified Democratic government* is interacted with *female legislator*, the coefficient will be positive. The influence of *female legislators* on welfare benefits is conditioned upon the presence of a liberal governing coalition. In the case of this model and hypothesis, predicted values are calculated to determine the influence of female legislators on welfare benefits in a liberal governing coalition. According to hypothesis 3 (H3), *when female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. If a female is chair of the social services committee in the state, the result will be an increase in maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three.

Table 9 shows the increases in the number of females who served as social services committee chairs from 1983-2002. The number of female social services

committee chairs has increased significantly since the late 1980s. From 1986 to 2001, there was a 78 percent increase in the number of female social services committee chairs. This research predicts the female influence on the committee responsible for welfare programs in the state will have an effect on the maximum monthly welfare benefits.

**TABLE 9 FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (WELFARE)
COMMITTEE CHAIR, 1983-2002**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>
1983	22	1993	32
1984	22	1994	32
1985	18	1995	31
1986	18	1996	29
1987	22	1997	30
1988	22	1998	31
1989	25	1999	32
1990	25	2000	34
1991	23	2001	32
1992	23	2002	16*

Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female social services (welfare) committee chair in either the House or Senate by year. N=1000 (50 states, 20 years). Among the various states, the committee name may differ with jurisdiction over welfare policy and spending. For example, Social Services, Social and Human Services, Health and Human Services Committee, or Health and Social Services. Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff*. The handbook began to report committee chairs differently in 2002 resulting in the drop in numbers from 2001 to 2002. The 2002 number may not reflect the total number of states with a female social services committee chair.

Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicts *female control of formal leadership positions is positively associated with policies favoring women's interests*. With an increase in the number of leadership positions held by females, the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* will be positive leading to an increase in welfare benefits. Finally,

according to hypothesis 5 (H5), *when parties share the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females*. When the variables of *female committee chair* and *female institutional incorporation* are interacted with *unified democrat government*, the party as a substantive model predicts an increase in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing coalition. Again, to understand the interaction terms and the conditional effects of a liberal governing coalition, predicted values are calculated. These values are expected to be negative because the political party shares these same policy preferences thus negating the influence of female legislators.

RESULTS

Table 10 presents the results of the preliminary models run on the data with the dependent variable *welfare benefits*. These results are provided to address the issue of collinearity, as discussed in Chapter III, and the interaction terms and conditional effects of each variable. Each theoretical model was run with only variables related to that model and the results are presented in the Table. The *Simple Incorporation Model* is represented by the interaction between *female legislators* and *unified democratic government* (Fem Ed Chair*UniDemGov). The model labeled “party” are the results of the full model to show the influence of female legislators is negated in Democratic controlled governments (liberal governing coalitions).

TABLE 10 PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS, 1983-2002

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Presence</i>	<i>Specific</i>	<i>Broad</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Party</i>
Female Legislators (%)	5.38* (.46)			5.83* (.53)	5.14* (.46)
Fem Leg *UniDemGov					2.44 (1.35)
Fem Soc Serv Chair		32.10* (7.99)		18.97* (7.23)	8.44 (7.25)
Fem SS Chair*UniDemGov					40.30* (12.03)
Fem Inst Incorporation			1.34* (.42)	-1.06* (.44)	-.23 (.50)
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov					-3.84* (1.16)
Unified Dem Gov	17.12* (7.80)	16.93* (8.38)	16.34* (8.26)	17.58* (7.89)	13.61 (14.61)
Democratic Legislators (%)	-.42 (.31)	-.69* (.30)	-.55 (.32)	.51 (.32)	-.48 (.31)
Citizen Liberalism	2.58* (.3)	2.98* (.29)	2.94* (.29)	2.58* (.30)	2.65* (.32)
Political Competition	5.87* (.46)	5.93* (.47)	6.30* (.43)	5.62* (.48)	5.63* (.46)
Income	-.01* (.00)	-.10* (.00)	-.01* (.00)	-.01* (.00)	-.01* (.00)
Poverty	-7.07* (1.24)	-7.89* (1.22)	-7.37* (1.21)	-7.38* (1.29)	-7.33* (1.34)
Fem Labor Force Part	.72 (.64)	3.10* (.73)	2.99* (.75)	.65 (.62)	.99 (.63)
Maximum Welfare Benefits	-.03 (.02)	-.02 (.12)	.02 (.01)	-.03 (.02)	-.03 (.02)
Constant	367.86* (65.45)	271.55* (69.30)	250.85* (69.22)	389.17* (66.92)	367.35* (67.03)
Wald χ^2	4485.33*	4833.37	5063.63*	4021.43*	4953.92*
R ²	.60	.57	.57	.60	.61

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Maximum Welfare Cash Benefits for a family of three (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=940 for all models (47 states, 20 years). AK, HI, and NE are excluded.

Table 11 presents the results of the full model. *The Presence Model* (H1) is supported by the results. The coefficient for *female legislators* is significant and positive meaning the increase in female descriptive representation results in an increase in welfare benefits in a state. *The Specific Institutional Incorporation Model* (H3) is not supported by the results so moving from a male to a female social services committee chairs does not provide any additional influence on the welfare benefits levels. *The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model* (H4) was not supported by these results as the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* was not significant.

In order to understand the conditional effect of a liberal governing coalition, predicted values were calculated and presented in Table 12 with interesting results. The *Simple Incorporation Model* (H2) predicts that female legislators only affect policy in a liberal governing coalition (unified Democratic government). According to these results, the hypothesis is not supported. However, when increasing the number of female legislators by one percentage point in states with a divided government or a Republican controlled government, it will result in an increase of \$5.14 in monthly welfare benefits. While the model did not predict an influence in a non-liberal governing coalition, these results have implication for future research. Figure 15 shows the effects of female legislators on monthly welfare benefits by party control of government.

TABLE 11 THE EFFECT OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS, 1983-2002

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
Female Legislators (%)	5.14* (.46)
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government	2.44 (1.35)
Female Social Services Committee Chair	8.44 (7.25)
Female Soci Serv Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government	40.30* (12.03)
Female Institutional Incorporation	-.23 (.50)
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government	-3.84* (1.16)
Unified Democratic Government	13.61 (14.61)
Democratic Legislators (%)	-.48 (.31)
Citizen Liberalism	2.65* (.32)
Political Competition	5.63* (.46)
Income	-.01* (.00)
Poverty	-7.33* (1.34)
Female Labor Force Participation	.99 (.63)
Maximum Welfare Benefits (%)	-.03 (.02)
Constant	367.35* (67.03)
Wald χ^2	4953.92*
R ²	.61

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Maximum Welfare Cash Benefits for a family of three (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=940 for all models (47 states, 20 years). AK, HI, and NE are excluded.

TABLE 12 PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (WELFARE) COMMITTEE CHAIR, AND FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Predicted Value</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>T-Statistic</i>
Female Legislators (%)			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	5.14*	.87	5.89
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	21.19	20.78	1.02
Female Social Services Committee Chair			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	8.44	9.56	.88
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	62.34*	26.91	2.32
Female Institutional Incorporation			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	-.23	.61	-.38
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	9.53	21.47	.44

Note: Cells represent dollar amounts. Predicted values for female legislator, female committee chair, and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ$. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z is present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=1 when unified Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).

The *Party as a Substantive Representative Model* (H5) is also not supported by these results. While the effect for female *social services committee chair* in a unified Democratic government is significant, it is in the wrong direction. Moving from a male committee chair to a female committee chairs in liberal governing coalitions results in an increase of monthly welfare benefits by \$62.34. The model predicts that the effect would be negative because the Democratic Party is taking up the issue of welfare benefits negating any additional influence from female committee chair. Figures 15, 16, and 17 provide a graphical illustration of the effects on welfare benefits by party control of government.


There are also a number of control variables with significant coefficients: *citizen liberalism*, *political competition index*, *income*, and *poverty*. In the case of *citizen liberalism* and *political competition index*, the coefficients are significant and positive. The more liberal ideological orientations in a state and the more competitive the party system, the more money for welfare benefits. In the case of *income* and *poverty*, both coefficients are negative.

FIGURE 15 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of percentage increase in females in state legislatures by party control of government.

FIGURE 16 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (WELFARE) COMMITTEE CHAIR ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT




Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of moving from a male social services (welfare) committee chair (0) to a female social services (welfare) committee chair (1) by party control of government.

DISCUSSION

The results of the models on *welfare benefits* are interesting and provide some significant results with female descriptive representation. An increase in female descriptive representation does exert additional influence on the maximum monthly welfare benefit levels in a state. The results indicate that increasing female legislators affect benefits but it occurs in a divided or unified Republican governing system. While the model does not make this prediction, it does have implications for future research. There were also interesting findings with the *Party as a Substantive Representative*

Model. While none of the effects were significant with the models predictions, increasing females legislators in a divided government or a unified Republican government results in an increase of maximum monthly welfare benefits. As mentioned in previous chapters, female descriptive representation and incorporation in a non-liberal governing coalition may be the area that needs to be addressed.

FIGURE 17 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON WELFARE BENEFIT LEVELS BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent dollar amounts as a result of increases in female institutional incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government.

An interesting way to dig deeper into this issue of female legislators influence on welfare benefit levels would be to examine the race of the legislators. While Preuhs did not find support for an increase in black legislators on welfare benefit levels, he did find that black legislators perceived their role to help those in need. Examining black female

legislators may provide for interesting results when examining benefit levels. As mentioned in previous chapters, bill sponsorship would be an interesting way to examine this issue also.

Since this is a funding issue, if one examined the finance committee, it may provide interesting results. While the social services chair would appear to be the person, and committee, responsible for welfare in the state, coding of this variable was challenging. Many states had a number of different social services type committees and judgment calls had to be made when coding. Since all states have finance chairs and/or appropriations chairs, the influence on spending on welfare may be coming from that position instead of the social services chair. Further, since this is an output of government, it is challenging to study. States are given flexibility in administering the program so examining this issue using another variable may provide for interesting results with the influence of female representation and incorporation.

A discussion of the overall findings and future research will be discussed in the last chapter.

CHAPTER VII

CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION IN THE STATES, 1983-1991

Females are found to identify with other females on issues or a group perspective on issues (Mansbridge 1995) and there is greater accountability between women legislators and females in the public (Carroll 1984, 2003). Child support would be a female group salient issue important to females because of their support of the welfare of families and children (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Carroll 1994; Thomas 1991; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991; Tamerius 1995; Flammang 1997; Carroll 2000; Carroll 2001; Carroll 2003). When there is an increase in female descriptive representation, there are more females in the legislature and in leadership positions to focus their attention on issues ignored in the past. It is not the argument in this research males do not care about increasing the percentage of child support payments and ensuring those payments are being received but since females prioritize issues like this one as highly important, we expect to find some changes in collection as a result. This chapter reviews the history of child support collection and enforcement in the United States, defines the model and hypotheses tested on the variable *percentage of child support collection*, and examines and discusses the results.

HISTORY OF CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Prior to 1975, child support collection and enforcement were inconsistent among the states and based on a case by case method of setting amounts for child support

orders. Since there were no uniform standards, the result was inadequate levels of support, inconsistency in the treatment of clients, and inefficient processes for determining the child support amount (Pearson, Thoennes, and Tjaden 1989). The level of support has received the most attention in research. In 1985, a study was conducted by the U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement and found that if basic guidelines had been set, similar to the model used in Delaware and Wisconsin, \$15 billion more in child support amounts would have been due (Haskins et al. 1985). Further, laws in individual states put the burden on parents to collect support for their children. If the noncustodial parent moved out of state, this became a larger burden because of interstate cooperation. By the 1980s, all states had enacted a version of the Uniform of Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act which allows for custodial parents to have easier access to non-custodial parents in other states and enforcement of child support orders. While it did not solve this problem, it was a step in the right direction (Zimmermann 1994).

In 1975, Title IV-D of the Social Security Act led to significant changes in the collection and enforcement of child support payments. A separate division was created as part of the U.S. Health and Human Services Department to oversee the operation of a child support enforcement program. The federal government required the states to establish a parent locator service, guideline for state operations, collect payments for all recipients of TANF, and a plan for the review of cases. In 1984, the Child Support Enforcement Amendments were enacted requiring all states to develop formulas to determine child support levels, mandatory income withholding procedures, processes to help expedite establishing and enforcing support orders, and allowing states to report

delinquent parents to consumer credit agencies. Also, the amendments required states to develop guidelines for child support and welfare cases. In 1988, The Family Support Act was enacted and required the courts to use state guidelines when establishing support amounts for non-welfare cases, and review their guidelines every four years (Legislative History of Child Support Enforcement, www.hhs.gov).


Wilkins and Kesier (2004) examined child support agencies in their work on passive and active representation. Passive representation is sometimes referred to as descriptive representation or the bureaucrat “looking like” the population she serves. Active representation occurs when bureaucrats use their discretion to advocate for the people they serve to help eliminate discrimination. They authors were interested in addressing the question of whether the link between passive and active representation only exist when the consequences affect women. In order for passive representation to affect active representation, two conditions must exist: first, bureaucrats must have discretion over the issue and second, the issue must be salient to women (Meier 1993; Wilkins and Keiser 2004). In the case of child support enforcement and collection, this is the case. Caseworkers and supervisors in child support divisions have discretion in implementation of programs. Because these supervisors and caseworkers can see the affect that child collection has on their clients, they may aggressively pursue collection. Also, supervisors review cases each month which can help the clients as well as creating an environment of expectations of the caseworkers. The caseworker’s role is also important because they are the one who deals directly with the clients, makes sure paperwork is in order, and research the case and resolve problems. The results from

their study indicate that when there are a larger number of female supervisors, child support collection increases but only when it is beneficial to women. In this case, TANF recipients may not benefit from receiving child support payments because of the risk of losing other financial assistance, informal support from the non-custodial parent, and in domestic violence cases, it may allow the abuser to locate the family. As they predicted, passive representation does affect active representation when the policies directly benefit women.

Significant changes have occurred at the state and national level with child support enforcement but the primary responsibility for enforcement falls on the state. Based on the Wilkins and Keiser study, the state level bureaucrats also play an important role in collection and enforcement. Therefore, the selection of the dependent variable, *child support collection*, is appropriate when determining the effect of female descriptive representation in state legislatures. Will female lawmakers have an impact on the child support collection as hypothesized in this study or, with the case of this variable, will there be other factors that exhibit more influence? This variable differs from the others in this work because education and welfare are funding issues and bureaucrats would not have direct influence on the amount of money allocated to the program.

Figure 18 represents the mean percentage of child support payments collected from 1983-1991. As you can see, the percentage of child support payment collected tripled from the early 1980s until the early 2000s. Given the responsibility of child support enforcement and collection on the states, this study should provide some interesting results on the influence of female representation.

FIGURE 18 CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION IN THE STATES, 1983-1991



Note: Values represent mean percentage of child support collected in the states by year. N=450 (50 states, 9 years). Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

The following model, as presented and explained in Chapter III, was used to estimate the coefficients for *percentage of child support collection*:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Child Support Collection}_{it+1} = & b_1(\text{female legislators}_{it}) + b_2(\text{female} \\ & \text{legislators}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_3(\text{female social services [child support]} \\ & \text{committee chair}_{it}) + b_4(\text{female social services [child support] committee} \\ & \text{chair}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_5(\text{female institutional incorporation}_{it}) + b_6(\text{female} \\ & \text{institutional incorporation}_{it} * \text{unified democrat}_{it}) + b_7(\text{female labor}_{it}) + b_8(\text{democrat} \\ & \text{legislature}_{it}) + b_9(\text{citizen liberalism}_{it}) + b_{10}(\text{political competition}_{it}) + \\ & b_{11}(\text{income}_{it}) + b_{12}(\text{poverty}_{it}) \end{aligned}$$

Chapter III explained all the hypotheses for this study. According to the first hypothesis (H1), *female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. Due to women's feeling of accountability to other women, and believing in supporting the health and welfare of children and families, an increase in the female descriptive representation results in an increase in the percentage of child support payments collected in the states. Hypothesis 2 (H2) states *when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. When *unified Democratic government* is interacted with *female legislator*, the coefficient will be positive. The influence of *female legislators* on child support collection is conditioned upon the presence of a liberal governing coalition. In the case of this model and hypothesis, predicted values are calculated to determine the influence of female legislators in a liberal governing coalition. According to hypothesis 3 (H3), *when female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies*. If a female is chair of the social services committee in the state, the result will be an increase in child support payments collected.

Table 13 shows the increases in the number of females who serve as social services committee chairs from 1983-1991. During this time period, there was not a large increase in females serving as committee chairs with jurisdiction over child support enforcement issues. However, from 1985 to about 1990, there was an increase of about

39 percent in females serving as social services committee chair with jurisdiction over child support enforcement.

TABLE 13 FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (CHILD SUPPORT) COMMITTEE CHAIRS, 1983-1991

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of States</i>
1983	22	1988	25
1984	22	1989	25
1985	18	1990	25
1986	18	1991	23
1987	25		

Note: Cells represent the total number of states with a female social services (child support) committee chair in either the House or Senate by year. N=450 (50 states, 9 years). Among the various states, the committee name may differ with jurisdiction over child support. For example, Social Services, Social and Human Services, Health and Human Services Committee, or Health and Social Services. Source: *State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff*.

Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicts *female control of formal leadership positions is positively associated with policies favoring women's interests*. With an increase in the number of leadership positions held by females, the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* will be positive leading to an increase in child support collection. Finally, according to hypothesis 5 (H5), *when parties share the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females*. When the variables of *female committee chair* and *female institutional incorporation* are interacted with *unified democrat government*, the party as a substantive model predicts an increase in representation or incorporation provides no additional effects in a liberal governing coalition. The coefficient for these interaction terms should be negative because the political party negates any influence of female legislators on child support collection.

Predicated values are calculated to interpret the results and significance of the interaction terms and the influence of female legislators, committee chairs, and female leadership in liberal governing coalitions on child health insurance coverage.

RESULTS

Table 14 presents the results of the preliminary models run on the data with the dependent variable *welfare benefits*. These results are provided to address the issue of collinearity and the importance of the interaction terms to the models in order to explain the conditional effects of each variable. Each theoretical model was run with only variables related to that model. The *Simple Incorporation Model* is represented by the interaction between *female legislators* and *unified democratic government* (Fem Ed Chair*UniDemGov). The results from the model labeled “party” is the full model to show influence of female legislators is negated in a liberal governing coalition.

Table 15 presents the results of the full model. *The Presence Model* (H1) is not supported by these results. The coefficients for *female legislators* is significant but it is in the wrong direction. Increasing the number of female legislators does not exert influence on child support collection in a state and according to these results, actually decreases the percentage collected. The *Specific Institutional Incorporation Model* (H3) is supported by these results. Moving from a male social services committee chair to a female chair results in an increase in the percentage of child support payments collected in a state. *The Broad Institutional Incorporation Model* (H4) was not supported as the coefficient for *female institutional incorporation* was not significant so there is no additional influence from females in leadership roles.

TABLE 14 PRELIMINARY MODELS OF THE ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION, 1983-1991

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Presence</i>	<i>Specific</i>	<i>Broad</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Party</i>
Female Legislators (%)	-.37* (.05)			-.49* (.08)	-.44* (.12)
Fem Leg*UniDemGov					-.14 (.52)
Fem Soc Serv Chair		1.24* (.63)		1.66* (.84)	2.58* (.91)
Fem SS Chair*UniDemGov					-2.64* (2.51)
Fem Inst Incorporation			-.00 (.04)	.13* (.06)	.15 (.10)
Fem Inst Inc*UniDemGov					-.06 (.16)
Unified Dem Gov	-3.91* (1.06)	-4.10* (1.01)	-4.14* (1.03)	-3.71* (1.04)	.47 (2.54)
Democratic Legislators (%)	.06* (.02)	.11* (.02)	.11* (.02)	.06* (.02)	.05* (.02)
Citizen Liberalism	.11* (.03)	.09* (.03)	.09* (.03)	.11* (.03)	.12* (.04)
Political Competition	.24* (.06)	.24* (.05)	.25* (.05)	.23* (.05)	.25* (.05)
Income	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)	.00* (.00)
Poverty	-.68* (.15)	-.54* (.14)	-.54* (.14)	-.68* (.15)	-.73* (.16)
Fem Labor Force Part	.19 (.11)	.09 (.11)	.10 (.11)	.17 (.12)	.13 (.11)
Child Support Collect. (%)	.13* (.03)	.13* (.03)	.13* (.03)	.14* (.03)	.15* (.03)
Constant	-14.53* (11.27)	-15.57 (11.07)	-16.02 (10.89)	-13.26* (11.86)	-12.95 (12.09)
Wald χ^2	392.57*	433.03*	388.85*	548.51*	819.45*
R ²	.37	.34	.34	.38	.38

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Child Support Collected (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=423 for all models (47 states, 9 years). AK, HI and NE are excluded.

TABLE 15 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE REPRESENTATION AND INCORPORATION ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION, 1983-1991

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>
Female Legislators (%)	-.44* (.12)
Female Legislators*Unified Dem Government	-.14 (.52)
Female Social Services Committee Chair	2.58* (.91)
Female Soc Serv Committee Chair*Unified Dem Government	-2.64* (2.51)
Female Institutional Incorporation	.15 (.10)
Female Institutional Incorporation*Unified Dem Government	-.06 (.16)
Unified Democratic Government	.47 (2.54)
Democratic Legislators (%)	.05* (.02)
Citizen Liberalism	.12* (.04)
Political Competition	.25* (.05)
Income	.00* (.00)
Poverty	-.73* (.16)
Female Labor Force Participation	.13 (.11)
Maximum Welfare Benefits (%)	.15* (.03)
Constant	-12.95 (12.09)
Wald χ^2	819.45*
R ²	.38

Note: *p<.05 in a one tailed t-test. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Child Support Collected (t+1). Cells contain OLS coefficients with Panel-Correlated Standard Errors in parentheses. N=423 for all models (47 states, 9 years). AK, HI and NE are excluded.

TABLE 16 PREDICTED VALUES OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS, FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (CHILD SUPPORT) COMMITTEE CHAIR, AND FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION, 1983-1991


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Predicted Value</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>T-Statistic</i>
Female Legislators (%)			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	-.44*	.12	-3.80
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	-.11	2.67	-.04
Female Social Services Committee Chair			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	2.58*	1.22	2.11
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	.41	3.12	.12
Female Institutional Incorporation			
<i>Divided or Unified Republican Government</i>	.15	.10	1.59
<i>Unified Democratic Government</i>	.55	2.78	.20

Note: Cells represent percentages. Predicted values for female legislator, female committee chair, and female institutional incorporation were calculated using the following formula: $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X + \beta_2 Z + \beta_3 XZ$. This illustrates the effect of a one-unit change in X on Y when condition Z is present and Z=0 when divided or unified Republican government is present and Z=0 when unified Democratic government is present (see Brambor et al. 2006).

To understand the conditional nature of influence from institutional incorporation, Table 16 presents the predicted values for *female legislators*, *female social services committee chair*, and *female institutional incorporation* on the percentage of child support collected by party control of government. *The Simple Institutional Incorporation Model* (H2) is not supported by these results. The effect of *female legislators* and in a *unified Democratic government* is not significant. Thus, the influence of female descriptive representation on child support payment collection is not conditioned by a liberal governing coalition. *The Party as a Substantive Representative Model* is also not supported. None of the effect of the independent variables in a liberal

governing coalition are significant. Interestingly, the effects of female legislators and female social services committee chair in a divided government or a unified Republican government is significant. For example, the Republican Party appears to be negating the influence of female legislators because the result is a decrease of .44 percentage points in child support collection. None of the models make a prediction about a non-liberal governing coalition but with these results, future research needs to consider this effect. Figures 19, 20, and 21 provide a graphical illustration of the effects by party control of government.


FIGURE 19 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE LEGISLATORS ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent percentages as a result of percentage increase in females in state legislatures by party control of government.


The following control variables had significant coefficients: *Democratic legislators, citizen liberalism, political competition index, income and poverty*. In the case of *Democratic legislators* and *citizen liberalism*, the coefficient is positive thus resulting in an increase in child support collection in states with more Democratic lawmakers and in more liberal states. In states with more party competition, child support payment collection increases. Finally, an increase in income in a state results in more child support collected while an increase in poverty rates results in a decrease.

FIGURE 20 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE SOCIAL SERVICES (CHILD SUPPORT) COMMITTEE CHAIR ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent percentages as a result of moving from a male social services (child support) committee chair (0) to a female social services (child support) committee chair (1) by party control of government.

FIGURE 21 THE EFFECTS OF FEMALE INSTITUTIONAL INCORPORATION ON CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTION BY PARTY CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT



Note: Values represent percentages as a result of increases in female institutional incorporation in the state legislature by party control of government.

DISCUSSION

For the dependent variable of *child support collection* in the state, the results are similar to the other variables. Female descriptive representation did influence the percentage of child support collected by a state. While increasing the number of females in the state legislatures did not result in any additional influence on the amount of child support collected, having a female serve as social services committee chair did lead to additional child support collected. As was the case with all the other dependent variables, *female institutional incorporation* also did not exert additional influence on

this variable. The *Party as a Substantive Representative Model* was also not supported by the results with this variable. In the presence of a liberal governing coalition, the results indicated that it does not negate the influence of female descriptive representation and incorporation. In the case of *female legislators*, the Republican Party may be negating the influence according to these results but further research would need to consider a non-liberal governing coalition in its model to full determine the influence.

In this case, Wilkins and Keiser may have found a better way of examining passive, or descriptive, representation. It could be in the case of child support, the bureaucrats have more influence over the policy output than the legislators. Also, while the state government still has control over enforcement, the federal government did establish mandates over the years which could have exerted more influence in this area than the individuals who serve in the legislature. This could have resulted in the bureaucratic agency charged with enforcing these new policies, thus, exerting more influence.

A discussion of the overall findings and future research will be discussed in the conclusions chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study contributed to the literature on female descriptive representation by examining female descriptive representation and incorporation in legislative bodies and answering the research question, does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues? Rather than simply studying the increase in females in legislatures, this study using state level data examined the complexity of the lawmaking body, the mechanisms determining influence, and the conditional effects of liberal governing coalitions, revealing the influence of female lawmakers. Previous work does not account for all of these effects until Preuhs' 2006 work using race. This study replicated that work using female descriptive representation in hopes of revealing the same conclusions about the effects of female descriptive representation and incorporation on public policy issues important to females. In a larger context, this work was designed to show the importance of a continued increase in the number of female lawmakers and the longevity of their terms giving them opportunities to serve in leadership roles and increasing their policy influence. While the increase in females in state legislatures has slowed significantly in the past decade, the number of women serving in committee chair positions and leadership positions, like speaker of the house, senate president, or majority and minority leaders has increased.

More women in office is a positive indicator of a trend toward gender equality, and the longer they are in these positions, the stronger their voice on female group salient issues.

Table 17 presents a summary of the overall findings for each model on each dependent variable. As revealed, few of the models were supported with the dependent variables selected for this study.

TABLE 17 SUMMARY OF MODELS AND RESULTS

<i>Models</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Welfare</i>	<i>Child Support</i>
Presence Model (H1)	x	x	YES	x
Simple Incorporation Model (H2)	x	x	x	x
Specific Institutional Incorporation Model (H3)	x	x	x	YES
Broad Institutional Incorporation Model (H4)	x	x	x	x
Party as a Substantive Representation Model (H5)	x	x	x	x

Note: YES indicates the model was supported for the identified dependent variable.

The results of this study did not strongly support the *Presence Model* (H1). This model predicts that female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies on the four dependent variables. In the case of *per pupil educational expenditures*, *percentage of children without health insurance*, and *percentage of child support collected*, the coefficients were not significant and in all cases, were in the wrong direction. The outcome is consistent with the findings of Preuhs that an increase in black representatives did not result in an increase in welfare benefits. Interestingly, with the variable *welfare benefits*, this study found significant results. An increase in female descriptive representation exerts influence on the

maximum monthly welfare benefits for a family of three in a state. Females express concern about the welfare of families and children so *welfare benefits* is a female group salient issue. Thus, female descriptive representation did influence substantive representation in this case.

Results from the *Specific Institutional Incorporation Model* (H3) are similar to the *Presence Model*. When female representatives hold positions of power over specific policy areas, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies. The presence of female committee chairs was examined to determine their influence in the four policy areas. While results for *per pupil educational expenditures* and *percentage of children without health insurance* were significant, they are in the wrong direction so the results did not support the hypothesis. The coefficient for *welfare benefits* was not significant. With the issue of *percentage of child support collected*, the results were significant and in the right direction. Having a female social services committee chair responsible for child support policy in a state exerts additional influence with increasing the percentage of child support collected. The structure of the committee system, where the major work is done on legislation, is important in the state. Legislators work hard for a place on these committees and to serve as chair because they understand the influence they can have over legislation in that policy area. Therefore, we expect to see significant results with this model. However, as noted in Chapter III, there are challenges to coding this variable. Without knowing the specific jurisdiction of each committee in each state, it may not be possible to know if the committee that works on this issue was correctly

specified making the testing of this model on all fifty states over a twenty year period. Further, since two of the dependent variables directly deal with funding, it is possible that the finance, appropriations, or budgetary committees in a state may have more influence over expenditures than the committees selected for this study.

In the case of the *Broad Institutional Incorporation Model* (H4), none of the models produced significant results in each of the four policy areas selected. According to the hypothesis, female control of formal leadership positions is positively associated with policies favoring women's interests. As females increased their numbers in leadership positions like speaker of the house, senate president, majority and minority party leaders, rules and finance committee chair, they did not exert more influence over the policy areas selected. The challenge with this model is that while there are general similarities in the structure of state legislatures, there are also differences in these legislatures based on the rules and procedures established. In some legislatures, the leadership may provide certain positions considerable authority and thus provide those individuals opportunities to exert influence over policy. In other states, the power structure could be different. There are enough similarities in order to test this model but the results indicate that different ways to study leadership may be better. Case studies would provide a better opportunity to test this model in order to gain an understanding of the leadership positions and the powers they have influencing policy. Also, this would allow the opportunity to examine the people in these positions and their actions with regards to women's interests and issues. While the position of lieutenant governor was excluded from the list of leadership positions because it is an elected position, it could be

interesting to examine the role of that individual in the state legislature. The individual in this position is accountable to her constituents so what action would a female in this office take to advance women's issues? It may also be interesting to examine the actions of speakers of the house, senate presidents or lieutenant governors, to determine if they appointed more females than males to committee chair positions or positions like majority or minority leader.

In order to test the last two models of the study, interaction terms were created. *Unified Democratic government* was interacted with *female legislators*, *female committee chair*, and *female institutional incorporation* to test the *Simple Incorporation Model* (H2) and the *Party as a Substantive Representative Model* (H5). To determine significance of the interaction terms, predicted values were calculated revealing the influence of X on Y with conditional affect Z. According to the *Simple Incorporation Model*, when female representatives are members of the governing coalition, female descriptive representation is positively associated with female group influence in representative bodies. When *female legislators* is interacted with *unified Democratic government*, the results should indicate female legislators only exert influence over the four policy areas if their presence occurs in a liberal governing coalition. With all the policy issues, *per pupil educational expenditures*, *percentage of children without health insurance*, *welfare benefits*, and *percentage of child support collected*, the results were not significant. While the models are not supported in this case, one could take the results to mean that female legislators can exert influence outside of liberal governing coalitions. The models did not specifically predict the influence of females in a non-

liberal governing coalition, divided government control or unified Republican government, and the results reveal something may be happening in that political environment. For example, in the case of *welfare benefits*, the predicted value for divided or unified Republican government is positive and significant. Would this mean that when female legislators are members of the Republican Party or in the presence of a divided government, they would exert more influence over welfare benefit levels, meaning that female influence is not confined to being part of a liberal governing coalition? These models don't control for this but it is interesting given the results and should be explored in future research. Further, this begs the question of whether the member's political party needs to be considered as mentioned in Chapter III. Since the number of female Democratic legislators has consistently been about 20 percentage points during the twenty years of this study, there are no trend changes, just consistency in the gap. But, with increases overall, there are increases in females in the Republican Party. Given what we learned from the literature on the 104th congress (1995-1996), a comparative study of state legislatures with larger proportion of female Democrats versus states with a larger proportion of female Republicans could provide interesting results. Case studies may be a better way to understand the full nature of what is going on in the states with welfare. Also, it would be interesting to study both Democratic and Republican female lawmakers to tease out the influence from those groups. If female legislatures are representing the group perspective no matter which party is in power, studying the political environment in a smaller number of states could provide more insight with this policy issue. As previously mentioned, knowing the female member's

political party could lead to interesting questions about female legislators working together across party lines. With a steady increase in both Democrat and Republican female legislators, do we see more collaboration on women's interests and issues? Is there a threshold that is reached that changes this collaboration? What if the Republicans are the majority party? Do female Republican legislators still cross party lines to work on issues important to females? Work has been done in these areas so examining political party and political environment based on what was learned from this work provides good questions for future research.

The *Party as a Substantive Representative* Model provided the most significant results in this study. The hypothesis predicts that when parties that share the policy goals of female representatives hold power, there is no relationship between levels of female representation or institutional power and policies benefitting females. The Democratic Party will address policy issues important to females so increasing the number of female in the legislature, having them serve as committee chairs over these policy areas, and increasing the number of females in leadership positions will not have any additional influence over policy. The party negates the female influence. With all the variables of this study, none of the results were significant. However, finding no support for this model could also mean that females are exerting some policy influence. In other words, the Democratic Party is not negating the influence of female lawmakers. Further, the results for divided government or unified Republican government are interesting. For example, with the variables *per pupil educational expenditures* and *percentage of child support collected*, the predicted values for female legislators and

female committee chair in a divided government or unified Republican government were negative and significant. Would this mean that the political environment (having divided control or when the Republican party is in charge) negates the influence female legislative influence over these two policy issues? Is the Republican Party addressing these issues or when the political environment is divided, are parties working together on addressing these female group salient issues? These questions cannot be answered by this study but it does provide questions for future research.

In summary, with three of the four dependent variables, female descriptive representation and incorporation did have some influence on substantive representation of female group salient issues. The female influence is important and increasing the number of females in the legislature will result in more policy and benefits for issues important to women in society. However, there are other ways one could study this issue to possibly reveal even stronger influence from increasing female numbers. There are challenges with testing these models as Preuhs did and with the issues selected for this study.

There are challenges with doing a pooled time series analysis with state legislatures. There are many similarities in the state legislative structure, processes, committee system, and leadership that lend itself to this type of study. At the same time, there are differences in state legislatures in these areas. If a case study were done, differences could be examined and control variables included. The problem with this study is examining the fifty states over a twenty year period provides challenges in collecting this type of data. Each legislative session, rules and procedures may change

in each legislature. The speaker of the house or senate president also has control over legislation and the committee it is assigned. Without knowing the dynamics of that particular legislative session, these are all unknowns. All one can do is speak in general terms. A case study could provide information on politics of the state, characteristics of the legislators and legislative leadership beyond what was collected in this study, specific jurisdiction of each committee and policy they oversee, and rules and procedures of that session. One could also look into the legislation that was sponsored by lawmakers which could provide an interesting analysis. Finally, the challenges faced with coding of female committee chairs in this study could be addressed in a case study or a study of a small number of legislators. In-depth research could be done of the committees in each state and the legislation over which they had jurisdiction. One could also examine the specific legislation in each committee to see if they were dealing with these particular female group salient issues. It could be that the finance, appropriations or budgeting committees in states exert more influence over legislation dealing with funding than committees with jurisdiction over that policy area. Having this information as well as knowing which legislation females are sponsoring could provide an interesting analysis in these areas. Also, through interviews, the priorities of female legislators could reveal which issues they support the most and tracking that legislation through the process and their involvement may provide interesting results.

Since the presence of a liberal governing coalition did not reveal significant results in this study, further analysis of political parties' role in the policymaking process could be examined. Many times legislators will find that while they have a personal

agenda, supporting their political party is the way to achieve their goals, whatever those goals may be. As Swers found in her work, female members of Congress revealed that they will change their sponsorship on legislation to advance their position as a member of the majority party (Swers 2000). This could be what was happening in this work. But, female lawmakers also reveal they work to promote women's rights legislation and represent women's issues. What kind of influence do female legislators have on their party? Are they influencing the agenda during the legislative session? In other words, are they exerting influence but not through the mechanisms tested in this study? Further, given the significant results of this study with divided or Republican control of government, are female Republican legislators shaping their party's agenda in terms of issues important to females? Given the results of this study, future research should control for these factors or develop a study that can address the female lawmakers of both political parties.

Preuhs' work studied the racialized political environment in the states. His findings revealed that a racialized political context results in no effect or negates the effect of black descriptive representation (2006). This work did not control for region to study that effect on female descriptive representation and incorporation. However, given what is known from this study, regional difference in political party may provide an interesting study. If divided control of government or a government in which the Republican Party is in control is influencing female representation, studying differences in political party and political environments across the states may provide an interesting analysis of female influence on policy issues. How is the Republican Party in northern

states different than southern states? Are there regional difference among female Democratic and Republican legislators and their ability to shape their party's agenda? How are the parties responding to female group salient issues when the control of government is divided? These questions would provide an interesting analysis given the results of this study.

As scholars have argued, "real" gains in policy responsiveness are dependent on achieving a critical mass, or moving from just a few "token" members to becoming the minority in the legislature (Childs and Krook 2008; Kanter 1977; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). As the numbers increase, females affect the culture of the legislature and begin to form alliances and coalitions. In most states, females have not reached this critical mass. An interesting study for future research would be to compare a state with a large number of females with a state that has not reached that "critical" level and determine what kind of influence women have over policy issues. The number of females may be critical to an analysis of governing bodies and women have not reached those numbers in most states and in Congress. As studies have revealed, women have been influential in local governing bodies when the governing board is smaller and the females have a larger presence (Flammang 1985). A caution in studying it this way would be females being too numerous to be considered a "cohesive group" and thus being female or male becomes less important to the legislators (Reingold 1992).

As Pitkin suggested decades ago, the study of representation should include all four dimensions formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic (1967). Significant amounts of research has examined formal representation and the rules and procedures

related to the selection of representatives and the importance of studying that along with descriptive representation (see Matland and Taylor 1997, for example). Further, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler did find connections between these four dimensions. The “formal representative structure and processes exert powerful influences on the extent of women’s descriptive representation, policy responsiveness, and symbolic representation” (2005, 424). Also, as Mansbridge suggests, studying promissory representation has an impact on legislative behavior because legislators are accountable to their constituents because of their election goals (Mansbridge 2003; Pitkin 1967).

Additional challenges with the selection of the dependent variables for this study are that each variable is a policy output: spending on education and welfare and percentage of children without health insurance and child support collected. Studies on legislatures reveal the influence of lawmakers in all policy areas because they are able to determine the budget and pass legislation that can affect all areas of government. However, Wilkins and Keiser may have a better approach to studying female descriptive representation in their study of bureaucrats. Will active representation only exist when consequences affect women? In their study, looking at female descriptive representation of bureaucrats may be a better approach because these individuals have discretion over the issue and implementation over the policy but also they deal directly with the recipients of the government service and understand the importance and how it directly benefits them. Also, an interesting study could examine the role of female legislators and their oversight of welfare bureaucracies. Are female lawmakers more engaged in the oversight process than their male colleagues? Are females more active in making

sure that the bureaucrats are doing their job and providing the services to recipients, especially in areas benefitting women? These questions could provide for an interesting analysis of female descriptive representation and the influence on substantive representation of female group salient issues.

Does an increase in female descriptive representation, institutional mechanisms of influence, or other political conditional factors lead to better substantive representation of female group salient issues? In the end, it is the hope for future research that females are able to represent the “group” perspective and support policy issues important to females in society. Examining the issue in a different way or with different dependent variables may provide better results indicating the importance of female descriptive representation on substantive representation of female group salient issues. With this study’s results, one can’t argue that the presence of more women in public office will mean they will be more represented because increasing their numbers is not significant...but it is necessary (Sapiro 1981).

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APPENDIX

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Description/Coding and Source</i>
DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
Per Pupil Educational Expenditures	2761-14018	6203	1999.29	Amount in constant dollars spent per student per year on education. <i>State Politics and Policy Quarterly</i> State Data Set.
Child Health Insurance Coverage	2.00-27.40	12.11	4.99	Percentage of children without health insurance. US Bureau of the Census.
Welfare Benefits	150.77-1036.33	489.7	159.15	Maximum AFDC/TANF cash benefit levels for a family of three, in dollars adjusted using Berry, Fording, and Hanson consumer price index. US Bureau of the Census (Preuhs data 1984-1993).
Child Support Collection	1.14-74.47	15.34	11.79	Percentage of voluntary child support payments collected by year. US Bureau of the Census (Kaiser data).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES				
Female Legislators	1.70-40.8	18.61	7.95	Percentage of the total legislative seats held by females. Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP).
Female Education Committee Chair	0-1	0.40	0.49	Indicates whether a woman (1) or a man (0) is committee chair with jurisdiction over education policy. <i>State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff</i> .
Female Health Committee Chair	0-1	0.49	0.50	Indicates whether a woman (1) or a man (0) is committee chair with jurisdiction over health policy. <i>State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff</i> .

Female Social Services (Welfare) Committee Chair	0-1	0.53	0.50	Indicates whether a woman (1) or a man (0) is committee chair with jurisdiction over welfare policy. <i>State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff.</i>
Female Social Services (Child Support) Committee Chair	0-1	0.55	0.50	Indicates whether a woman (1) or a man (0) is committee chair with jurisdiction over child support policy. <i>State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff.</i>
Female Institutional Incorporation	0-1	16.7	10.15	<p>Chamber institutional incorporation is coded with the following formula: $\text{Institutional Incorporation}_{\text{fist}} = 100 \times \frac{\sum W_{\text{fist}} P_{\text{ist}}}{\sum W_{\text{fit}}}$</p> <p>(Upper Chamber Institutional Incorporation+Lower Chamber Institutional Incorporation)/2.</p> <p>Chamber power is determines for female group f, in each chamber I, in each state s, in year t. P is 1 if the position is held by a female and 0 otherwise. W is the weight given to each position. The chamber power score is scaled so that the range is from 0, indicating no females hold these positions, to 100, indicating that females hold all institutional positions.</p> <p>Lower house weights: 10 for Speaker; 8 for Speaker pro tem or Assist. Speaker (coded only if this position is held by one individual); 8 for Majority Party Leader of Fiscal Policy Chairs; 7 for Rules Committee; 6 for other committee chairs; 5 for Minority Party Leader.</p>

Upper house weights: 10 for Presiding Officer (not coded if President is Lt. Gov.; 10 for President pro tem (8 if President is presiding officer); 8 for Majority Party Leader of Fiscal Policy Chairs; 7 for Rules Committee; 6 for other committee chairs; 5 for Minority Party Leader.

State Legislative Leadership, Committees, and Staff.

Unified Democratic Government	0-1	0.272	0.45	Indicates a liberal governing coalition and coded 1 if Democratic Party controls the state legislature and governor's office, 0 otherwise. Klarner 2003 (see references).
Democratic Legislators	11.43-95.40	56.46	16.66	Percentage of the total legislative seats held by the Democratic Party. Klarner 2003 (see references).
Citizen Liberalism	8.45-95.97	48.41	14.82	Indicates the state-year citizen liberalism index ranging from 0, indicating the most conservative, to 100. the most liberal.
Political Competition	9.26-56.58	39.03	11.29	Political competition equals 1- 50-percent legislative seats held by Democrats . Range is 0 for least competitive to 50 for most competitive. <i>State Politics and Policy Quarterly</i> State Data Set.
Income	8126.60-42706	2014 7	6491.75	Indicates per capita income in constant thousands of dollars. <i>State Politics and Policy Quarterly</i> State Data Set.
Poverty	2.90-27.00	12.98	4.02	Indicates the percent of the population living below the poverty threshold. US Bureau of the Census.
Female Labor Force Participation	38.40-73.10	59.06	5.04	Indicates the percent of females in the workforce. <i>State Politics and Policy Quarterly</i> .

VITA

Mary Elizabeth Barnes received her Associate of Arts degree in general studies from Blinn College in 1993. She entered the Government program at The University of Texas at Austin in August 1993 and received a Bachelor of Arts in Government in 1995. In August 1995, she entered the Political Science program at Sam Houston State University and graduated in 1997 with a Master of Arts in Political Science. Barnes received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Texas A&M University in 2011. Since 1995, she has been a faculty member at Blinn College, Brenham campus, teaching federal and state government courses, and she currently serves as Social Sciences Division Chair. Her research interests include voting behavior and gender politics.

Dr. Barnes may be reached at Blinn College, 902 College Ave., Brenham, Texas 77833. Her email is mbarnes@blinn.edu.